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SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY 
1.  This report is concerned with quantifying and analysing the VAT gap in each EU 
Member State over the period 2000–2006.  It has been prepared by Reckon LLP in the 
context of a study carried out for the European Commission. 
We provide estimates of the VAT gap 
2.  We provide estimates of the VAT gap based on a comparison of accrued VAT receipts 
with a theoretical net VAT liability for the economy as a whole.  We estimate the 
theoretical net liability by identifying the categories of expenditure that give rise to 
irrecoverable VAT and combining these with appropriate VAT rates.   
3.  The VAT gap is not a measure of VAT fraud.  For example: 
(a)  The VAT gap might include VAT not paid as a result of legitimate tax avoidance 
measures. 
(b)  The VAT gap is estimated primarily on the basis of national accounts data, and 
therefore depends on the accuracy and the completeness of such data.  Moreover, 
it does not take account of taxable activities that are outside the scope of national 
accounts. 
(c)  Due to lack of data, we do not adjust our estimates of the VAT gap to remove the 
VAT that is not collected due to insolvencies arising as a result of regular 
business activity, yet this portion of VAT that is not remitted is not due to VAT 
fraud. 
4.  The estimates presented in this report are of the VAT gap, as defined above, and not of 
VAT fraud.  
We focus on a top-down approach to estimating the VAT gap 
5.  The main focus of our research is to derive top-down estimates of the VAT gap, 
obtained by comparing total accrued tax receipts with a theoretical tax liability 
calculated from general economic data.  They can be contrasted with bottom-up 
estimates, which are derived by extrapolating data relating to individual companies or 
discovered frauds. 
6.  Our top-down approach relies on published national accounts.  We are only able to 
develop these estimates for those Member States where relevant national accounts 
data are publicly available. 
7.  We are unable to produce similar estimates on the basis of a bottom-up approach that 
compiles information from surveys or other studies on estimates of particular types of 
VAT fraud, as: Section 1: Introduction and summary   
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(a)  Published data on the size of different types of VAT fraud are insufficient — 
indeed they are scant — to allow us to piece together an estimate of VAT fraud in 
the economy as a whole.   
(b)  There may be a selection bias.  Presenting the value of the different types of VAT 
fraud detected by tax agencies, as reported by some in annual reports, would risk 
giving a distorted account of the relative importance of different types of VAT 
fraud as well as of overall level of VAT fraud.   
(c)  The raw data underlying the estimates of particular types of VAT fraud that we 
aware of are based, almost invariably, on operational data held by the tax 
agencies.  Generally, these are confidential, as are the methods used to derive 
them.   
8.  The top-down approach allows us to estimate the VAT gap in the economy as a whole 
but it does not allow us to characterise it in terms of identifying what sectors, or trade 
in what goods, or what types of business are more susceptible to VAT fraud. 
9.  Our top-down approach is comparable to those that we have found published by 
national tax agencies.  It is also related to the approach followed in the compilation of 
VAT own resources accounts submitted annually by each Member State to the 
European Commission. 
We draw on national accounts to compute net VAT liability 
10.  A top-down estimate of the VAT gap is based on comparing accrued VAT receipts 
with a theoretical net VAT liability for the economy as a whole.  We estimate the 
theoretical net liability by identifying and measuring the categories of expenditure 
that give rise to irrecoverable VAT.   
11.  The main categories of relevant expenditure that give rise to irrecoverable VAT are 
final consumption expenditure by households, non-profit institutions serving 
households (NPISH) and government, intermediate consumption expenditure on 
goods and services used in making exempt supplies of goods and services; and gross 
fixed capital formation on assets and changes in the stock of valuables which can be 
allocated to exempt supplies of goods and services. 
12.  National accounts data provide the primary information for our estimates of the value 
of these transactions that give rise to irrecoverable VAT.  Within this, we draw in 
particular on published use tables which report the use of goods and services by 
product category and by type of use.  Because of this structure, use tables lend 
themselves to the task of identifying transactions that give rise to irrecoverable VAT. 
13.  Our analysis is broadly based on Member States’ use tables downloaded from 
Eurostat on 30 June 2008.  Use tables were available for all Member States for some 
of the years in the period 2000–2006, with the exception of Greece and Latvia for 
which use tables were only found for some years prior to 2000 and of Cyprus, for 
which we were told by the National Accounts Division of the Cypriot Ministry of 
Finance that no use tables were publicly available.  Because these tables are at the 
heart of our top-down approach we do not include Cyprus in our analysis. Section 1: Introduction and summary   
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14.  To estimate the VAT liability associated with transactions on which VAT is not 
recovered, it is necessary to apply the appropriate VAT rate.  Information on the 
applicable VAT rates is drawn from national VAT legislation and secondary sources. 
We adjust our estimate to account for items affecting net VAT liability 
15.  We make a series of adjustments to the estimates we obtain through the approach 
outlined above to take account of a number of features common to the VAT systems in 
most Member States.  In particular, we adjust our estimates to reflect the fact that in 
most Member States an exemption from registration is granted to businesses with a 
turnover below a certain threshold.  We also make adjustments to reflect the 
limitations relating to the recoverability by corporations of expenditure on 
entertainment and on the purchase of company cars.   
16.  In the case of Luxembourg, our estimation makes a further adjustment to capture the 
contribution to the VAT liability associated with “tank tourism”, the practice of 
haulage and transport companies from other Member States filling up their trucks 
with diesel and petrol in Luxembourg, whether for logistical reasons or to benefit 
from differences in fuel prices.  
Limitations of estimating theoretical VAT liability from national accounts 
17.  There are three main types of limitations in using national accounts data for the 
purpose of estimating VAT gap.  The first relates to the fineness of the data available, 
the second relates to the coverage of national accounts insofar as they measure taxable 
activity, and the third to the question of whether the national accounts data accurately 
measure what they are supposed to.  We consider the implication of each in turn. 
18.  The minutiae of the VAT system in most Member States is such that it would require 
unfeasibly detailed information about the pattern of transactions in an economy to 
ensure that the correct VAT treatment is applied to a given volume of trade.  As an 
example, it would be necessary to know how expenditure by Danish consumers on 
football matches is divided between games where both teams fielded professionals 
and games where that is not the case; the former attract a standard VAT rate, the latter 
are exempt.  We are certain that pursuing data that would allow us make this split, and 
that would allow us to accommodate all of the details of the VAT legislation more 
generally, is not a feasible exercise. 
19.  The top-down approach requires instead an exercise of judgement to identify those 
trades that are thought to have a material impact on the measure of net VAT liability at 
the economy-wide level.  For example, in many Member States, the rates applied to 
food products are lower than those applied to beverages.  Further, expenditure on food 
products and beverages account for a significant share of household consumption.  
Based on this, we take a view that it is appropriate to consider the contribution to net 
VAT liability of the expenditure in these two classes of products separately.  Indeed, 
we take the view that it is appropriate to examine expenditure in these classes of 
products at an even greater level of detail, for example distinguishing between 
alcoholic and non-alcoholic drinks.  There are data which allow us to explore this.  On 
some other points, which would also have a material impact on our estimates, the 
national accounts data available to us do not allow for detailed analysis. Section 1: Introduction and summary   
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20.  Our top-down approach relies on the extent of the overlap between taxable activities 
and those that contribute to national accounts.  Some activities fall outside this 
overlap, as is the case of own house building, or of the exemptions to small 
businesses.  To address this, it is necessary to draw on data outside of national 
accounts, where such data are available.  
21.  Our top-down estimation of the VAT gap relies on the premise that the national 
accounts data, and the use tables in particular, have been compiled in line with the 
European System of Accounts 95 (ESA 95).  An important corollary of this is that 
national accounts data are deemed to include the contribution of the shadow economy, 
as ESA 95 requires.  An inadequate or inconsistent estimation by statistics offices of 
this contribution will have a direct impact on our estimates of the theoretical VAT 
liability. 
We have contrasted our approach with that of other institutions 
22.  Our work has benefitted from contact with national tax authorities, national statistics 
offices and other relevant government departments in Member States.   
23.  We shared details of our approach and interim results with relevant institutions from 
Member States and have used the information and feedback received from them to 
improve our estimates.   
24.  At a late stage of the study, for almost all Member States, we were granted access to 
the VAT own resources accounts that are submitted annually to the European 
Commission.  There is considerable overlap in the methods used in our top-down 
approach to estimating VAT gap and the approach adopted by Member States in those 
submissions for the purpose of estimating the weighted average VAT rate.  We have 
not sought to reconcile our estimates with those reported in the own resources 
accounts, nor have we used data contained within them.  Rather, we have used the 
workings submitted within the own resources accounts to help us identify errors and 
unjustified assumptions that we might have made in our analysis.  Where these were 
found, we sought to correct them by drawing on alternative, published information or 
on information obtained directly from national institutions. 
Our top-down estimates of VAT gap 
25.  We have estimated The VAT gap for each of the Member States, other than Cyprus, 
for each of the years in the period 2000-2006.   Table 1 presents our estimates of the 
VAT gap for the EU-25, the EU-10 and for the EU-15 in value terms.  Table 2 reports 
the gap as a share of the net theoretical liability. 
Table 1  Aggregate estimates of the VAT gap, 2000-2006 (EUR billion) 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
EU-10  6.5 8.3 8.3 7.6 8.6 8.1 7.9 
EU-15  84.4 96.2 98.9  101.1  103.6  105.2 98.8 
EU-25  90.9 104.5 107.1 108.7 112.3 113.3 106.7 
Note: EU-10 and EU-25 exclude Cyprus.  Non-Euro currencies converted to EUR using the average exchange rate in each 
year.. Section 1: Introduction and summary   
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Table 2  Aggregate estimates of the VAT gap as a share of theoretical liability, 2000-2006  
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005  2006 
EU-10  20% 22% 20% 19% 19% 16%  14% 
EU-15  12% 13% 13% 14% 13% 13%  12% 
EU-25  13% 14% 14% 14% 14% 13%  12% 
Note: EU-10 and EU-25 exclude Cyprus. 
26.  We estimate the overall VAT gap in the EU-25 has, in value terms, shown an increase 
over the period from 2000 to 2005, but a drop from 2005 to 2006.  As a share of 
theoretical liability, we estimate that the VAT gap for the EU-25 remained fairly stable 
from 2000 to 2004 and that it then fell by two percentage points between 2004 and 
2006.  
Table 3  Estimates of the VAT gap, 2006 (EUR million) 
Member State  Theoretical VAT 
liability  VAT receipts  VAT gap  VAT gap as a share of 
theoretical liability 
AT 22,844  19,735  3,108  14% 
BE 25,360  22,569  2,791  11% 
CZ 9,216  7,541  1,675  18% 
DE 164,115  147,150  16,965  10% 
DK 23,611  22,560  1,051  4% 
EE 1,325  1,215  111  8% 
ES 63,013  61,595  1,418  2% 
FI 15,176  14,418  758  5% 
FR 140,817  131,017  9,800  7% 
GR 21,746  15,183  6,563  30% 
HU 8,882  6,813  2,070  23% 
IE 14,043  13,802  241  2% 
IT 119,197  92,860  26,337  22% 
LT 2,335  1,826  510  22% 
LU 1,961  1,941  20  1% 
LV 1,751  1,374  378  22% 
MT 463  410  53  11% 
NL 41,269  39,888  1,381  3% 
PL 23,784  22,127  1,657  7% 
PT 14,371  13,757  614  4% 
SE 29,294  28,487  807  3% 
SI 2,764  2,647  116  4% 
SK 4,632  3,320  1,312  28% 
UK 155,697  128,721  26,976  17% 
EU-25 907,667  800,955  106,712 12% 
Note: EU-25 excludes Cyprus.  Non-Euro currencies converted to EUR using the average exchange rate in 2006.  Section 1: Introduction and summary   
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We examine the sensitivity of our results to the set of most material assumptions 
27.  We identified four assumptions in our top-down approach which we expect to have a 
material impact on the estimated VAT gap and for which we have a limited empirical 
basis.  These concern the assumptions on the proportion of consumption by the 
education and by the financial sectors on which VAT is not recoverable, on how gross 
fixed capital formation on dwellings is split between investments in new dwellings 
and expenditure on major improvements to existing dwellings and on the size of the 
adjustment to be done to account for the VAT treatment of company cars. 
28.  We examined the sensitivity of our results to these assumptions and find that they do 
have some impact on our results.  The impact is greatest with regards to the 
assumption on the proportion of consumption by the financial sector on which VAT is 
not recoverable.  
Comparison with other published estimates of VAT gaps 
29.  We have found published top-down estimates of the VAT gap relating to the period 
from 2000 to 2006 for only a handful of Member States, namely for Denmark, 
Germany, Italy, Sweden and the UK.  Other than for Germany, these estimates are 
computed by the relevant national tax agency or statistics office.  The estimates are 
typically accompanied by only a brief description of the precise data sources and 
assumptions that underpin the estimation.  This limits our ability to interpret the 
differences between our estimates and those that we have found published.  But we 
are aware of two general points that are likely to explain much of the differences.  
First, we expect national tax agencies and statistics offices to have access to more 
detailed or recent national accounts data than that which are published, and therefore 
available to us in the course of the study.  We note too that national accounts data are 
often revised over time and differences between our set of estimates of the VAT and 
those published by national tax agencies will also differ where we have drawn on 
different revisions of the data.  Second, we have extracted figures on accrued VAT 
receipts from Eurostat, and, with the exception of Denmark, these do not match the 
figures used in the estimates of the Member States mentioned earlier. 
30.  Not withstanding these differences, we, we find that our estimates of the VAT gap for 
Germany, Italy and the UK follow a similar trend to the published estimates for these 
countries that we have come across. 
31.  We have found even fewer — two — published bottom-up estimates of VAT gaps; 
one by the UK’s HM Customs and Excise in 2002 and the second by the Swedish 
Skatteverket in 2008.  These studies draw on a range of data sources, including 
surveys and operational data, to identify the relative importance of different types of 
VAT losses.  Both agencies qualify their findings by noting the significant degree of 
uncertainty around their estimates.  We do not think it reasonable to draw on the 
findings of these two isolated studies to make inferences about the characterisation of 
the VAT gap across the EU.  Section 1: Introduction and summary   
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Econometric analysis of the VAT gap 
32.  We conducted econometric analysis to assist in the understanding of the nature and 
causes of the VAT gap, and to identify country-specific characteristics that appear 
related to different levels of the VAT gap. 
33.  The variable found to have the strongest relationship with the size of the VAT gap was 
that connected with the perceived level of corruption in the country.  The relationship 
implies that lower perceived corruption is associated with a lower VAT gap.   
34.  The main difference between our analysis and the results obtained by other studies 
surrounds the relationship between the VAT gap and the VAT burden.  If the VAT 
burden, characterised by the ratio between the theoretical VAT liability and GDP, is 
treated as a candidate explanatory variable, then we find that it has a significant 
positive relationship with the VAT gap.  This is in line with the limited literature on 
this topic, and with the theory that a higher tax burden should lead to higher levels of 
evasion.  We have identified a risk that this estimated relationship may be biased by 
measurement errors in the estimation of the theoretical liability.  Once this risk has 
been taken into account by using an instrumental variable regression, we find no 
statistically significant relationship between the VAT gap and the VAT burden.   Section 2: Top-down estimates of the VAT gap   
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SECTION 2: TOP-DOWN ESTIMATES OF THE VAT GAP 
35.  This section sets out, in more detail, the results of our top-down estimation of the VAT 
gap across Member States in the period 2000-2006.  Our analysis draws on an array 
of assumptions and we present in this section the relative impact of some of these 
assumptions on the estimated VAT gap.  This sensitivity analysis focuses on those 
assumptions that are of greater materiality and for which we have less evidence 
underpinning them.  Charts and tables reporting the full set of results for each 
Member State are presented at the end of this section. 
36.  In this section we refer at times to the EU-25 to mean the set of Member States in our 
analysis.  We do so for convenience, as strictly speaking this is not correct: Cyprus is 
not included in our analysis because no use tables are available for it, and we have 
therefore only estimated the VAT gap for 24 Member States.  Similarly, we use the 
term EU-10 to refer to those Member States that joined the EU in 2004 although again 
Cyprus is not included. 
Results 
37.  The estimates of the VAT gap for each Member State over the period 2000–2006 are 
set out in a chart and in an accompanying table in the pages at the end of this section.  
Ahead of presenting those charts, we set out a brief overview and discussion of our 
estimates. 
There is no common trend in VAT gap across Member States 
38.  There is no common trend in the estimated VAT gap over the period 2000–2006 
across the 24 Member States.   
39.  For most, the estimated VAT gap exhibits a slight downward trend, the decreases 
tending to be sharper over the period 2003 to 2006.  Over the entire period of 
observations the decreases have been most pronounced in Luxembourg (from 12 per 
cent in 2000 to 1 percent in 2006), in Poland (from 22 per cent in 2000 to 7 per cent in 
2006) and in Slovenia (from 16 per cent in 2000 to 4 per cent in 2006).  
40.  The estimated gap for Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Sweden and Slovenia have shown a steady year-on-year fall for most years, 
particularly in the latter half of the period analysed. 
41.  For Austria, Germany, France, Finland and the UK, the VAT gap has been estimated 
to be relatively stable, fluctuating within a relatively narrow band. 
42.  For Greece, Hungary and Lithuania, we estimate that the VAT gap has increased from 
2000 or 2001 to the later years of our sample period.  We have estimated the Greek 
gap to have increased from 20 per cent in 2001 to 30 per cent in 2006.  For Hungary, 
we estimated the gap to have increased in the earlier years and to have remained 
relatively stable since; the gap increased from 15 per cent in 2000 to 25 per cent in 
2002 and has remained at that level, or slightly below, until 2006.  The gap for 
Lithuania is estimated to have risen from 15 per cent in 2000 to 28 per cent in 2004, 
from which it subsequently fell; for 2006 it was estimated to be 22 per cent.  Section 2: Top-down estimates of the VAT gap   
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43.  The observation that for many of the Member States the estimated VAT gap have 
fallen over the period, particularly in the second half of the sample period, applies 
more widely than to the Member States joining the EU in 2004 though it is most 
noticeable amongst the newer members.  In this regard, we note that the VAT gap for 
Estonia dropped from 21 per cent in 2004 to 8 per cent in 2006 and for Latvia they 
fell from 31 to 22 per cent over that same period.  We have already noted above that 
for Lithuania we estimated the VAT gap falling between 2004 (28 per cent) and 2006 
(22 per cent).  The reforms to the VAT legislation and/or the greater effort in gaining 
fiscal efficiency that may be associated with joining the EU are potential explanations 
of the remarkable fall in the VAT gap of these Member States.  However, the estimates 
for the Czech Republic and Slovakia are contrary to this interpretation.  In those 
Member States, the estimated gaps have risen between 2004 and 2006: from 24 to 28 
per cent in the case of Slovakia and from 13 to 18 per cent in the case of the Czech 
Republic (although until 2003 the estimated gap for the Czech Republic fluctuates 
around 16 per cent).  
44.  Figure 1 provides a summary of the discussion set out above.  The figure plots the 
estimated VAT gap expressed as a share of theoretical net liability in 2006 against the 
estimate we obtained for 2000.  The dashed diagonal line in the figure is a 45 degree 
line.  For those Member States lying above this diagonal line, the VAT gap is 
estimated to have increased between 2000 and 2006. For those below the line, the 
VAT gap is estimated to have fallen.  As can be read from Figure 1, most Member 
States are in the latter group. 
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A closer look at the trend of the VAT gap for some Member States 
45.  We turn now to an analysis of the evolution of the VAT gap for specific Member 
States.  For many Member States, we find little to comment on with regard to the 
evolution of the VAT gap between 2000 and 2006 that is not already apparent from 
the relevant figures and tables presented at the end of this section.  In many cases, we 
have no particular insights to offer on the movement of accrued receipts relative to the 
estimated VAT liability.  Clearly, it could be of interest to understand why receipts 
may have grown faster or slower than estimated liability — did the tax authority put 
more resources in the fight against VAT fraud or did it change its mode of operations 
— but this is beyond the scope of the study. 
46.  In the light of this, the discussion below focuses on a set of Member States for which 
we observe movements in the estimated VAT gap which might merit a supplementary 
comment.  
The Czech Republic 
47.  As a share of the theoretical net VAT liability, the estimated VAT gap for the Czech 
Republic remained at around the 16 per cent level from 2000 to 2003 but in 2004 fall 
to 13 per cent, dropped marginally to 12 per cent in 2005 but then increased to 18 per 
cent in 2006.  Behind this increase between 2005 and 2006 lies the fact that the 
estimated net VAT liability rose considerably, from CZK 245 to CZK 261 million, 
whilst accrued receipts fell slightly, from CZK 215 billion to CZK 214 billion in 
2006.  In turn, the increased liability was driven almost entirely by a significant 
growth in household final consumption.  There were no changes in the standard rates 
over this period.  We note, lastly, that our estimates for the Czech Republic for both 
2005 and 2006 are based on extrapolated use tables, as described in Section 5.   
However, we take comfort from the fact that the Czech total household consumption 
did register such high levels of growth in this period and so we do not believe that the 
estimated jump in the VAT gap are driven by the method we have used to extrapolate 
use tables.  
Estonia 
48.  Our estimates of the Estonian VAT gap show a sharp fall between 2004 and 2005, 
from 21 per cent to 9 per cent.  There was no change to the standard rate in these 
years nor does it appear to us that that the VAT legislation with regards to the 
applicability of rates was changed in any other way that would impact significantly on 
the trend of the net VAT liability.  Rather, it has been the trend in accrued receipts 
which has changed since 2004; whilst this had grown at an average rate of around 9 
per cent a year between 2000 and 2004, between 2004 and 2006 receipts grew by 
around 28 per cent a year. 
Hungary 
49.  The trend of the VAT gap estimated for Hungary is an interesting one: it increases 
steadily from 15 per cent in 2000 to 25 per cent in 2002 and, following a slight fall in 
2003, it remains relatively stable at around 24 per cent.  We have no insight to 
account for the increase in the VAT gap in the earlier years.  We do note, however, Section 2: Top-down estimates of the VAT gap   
www.reckon.co.uk  15 
that the VAT rate system was simplified in 2004 and the standard rate was reduced 
from 25 to 20 per cent in January 2006.  Neither appears to have had an appreciable 
impact on VAT gap, which remained relatively flat. 
Luxembourg 
50.  Our estimates for Luxembourg show a considerable drop in the VAT gap from 12 per 
cent in 2000 to 2 per cent in 2004 before increasing to 5 per cent in 2005 and then 
falling back to 1 per cent in 2006.  There is a great margin of uncertainty surrounding 
our estimate of Luxembourg VAT gap. 
51.  One source of this uncertainty relates to the sensitivity of the results to the assumption 
on the value of propex of the financial sector.  We reported in Table 6 that changing 
the value of that parameter from 50 per cent to 25 per cent would cause our estimate 
of the VAT gap in 2006 to be 10.3 percentage points lower, and if, instead, the 
parameter had been set at 100 per cent, the gap would have been 8.8 percentage points 
higher.   
52.  A second cause of uncertainty relates to the estimation of the net VAT liability 
associated with “tank tourism”, the practice of foreign haulage and transport 
businesses filling up their trucks in Luxembourg to take advantage of the price 
differences.  This is a significant activity as may be inferred from the observation in a 
recent Commission document that “whereas the consumption of diesel per capita is 
less than 750 litres in other Member States, it amounts to more than 4,200 litres in 
Luxembourg”. 
1  The significance of this activity is also explicitly recognized in the 
submissions by Luxembourg to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change on its national inventory of greenhouse gases; its 2008 submission 
reports that, in 2006, 18 per cent of diesel sold in Luxembourg was consumed in the 
country whereas the remaining 82 per cent was “exported”.
2 
53.  We understand that trade relating to “tank tourism” should be recorded in the 
Luxembourg use tables as exports of diesel or petrol.  Our top–down approach 
assumes that, in general, no VAT liability arises from exports.  In this instance, 
however, we understand that foreign trucks will pay the VAT due on the diesel or fuel 
and that those entitled to a VAT refund will not necessarily always apply for a refund 
from the Luxembourg tax agency.  It is necessary, therefore to estimate the 
contribution to the Luxembourg net theoretical VAT liability that is associated with 
these “exports”.  
                                                 
1  European Commission (2007) “Accompanying document to the Proposal for a Council Directive amending Directive 
2003/96/EC as regards the adjustment of special tax arrangements for gas oil used as motor fuel for commercial purposes 
and the coordination of taxation of unleaded petrol and gas oil used as motor fuel”, Staff Working Paper {COM(2007) 52 
final}, p. 8.  HTML version available from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52007SC0170:EN:HTML , accessed on 3 August 2009. 
2  Ministère de l’Environnement, Luxembourg (2008) “Luxembourg’s National Inventory Report 1990-2006 – Submission 
under the United Nations Convention on Climate Change and voluntary submission under the Kyoto Protocol”, Table 
3.44.  Available from 
http://unfccc.int/national_reports/annex_i_ghg_inventories/national_inventories_submissions/items/4303.php , accessed 
on 3 August 2009. Section 2: Top-down estimates of the VAT gap   
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54.  We have not come across published data on the amount of “tank tourism” on which 
the VAT is not recovered.  For the purpose of our estimation we have assumed, as 
noted in Section 6 that all of the exports relating to the product category “Coke, 
refined petroleum products and nuclear fuels” refer to sales of diesel or petrol to “tank 
tourists” and have further assumed that none of the VAT associated with this is 
recovered.   
Portugal 
55.  We estimate that there was a fall in the VAT gap as a share of liabilities in Portugal 
over the sample period as a whole and a sharp drop in particular between 2004 (8 per 
cent) and 2005 (3 per cent).  Use tables are available for the period 2000–2005 
implying that the estimated drop is not linked to our forecasting technique.  Annual 
reports from the Portuguese Ministry of Finance and Public Administration on the 
fight against fiscal fraud and evasion for the more recent years give emphasis to the 
greater operational effort in targeting VAT fraud, notably MTIC but we are unable to 
identify specific initiatives as the cause of the observed fall in the VAT gap from 
2004 to 2005.  We note, however, that the standard rate of VAT did increase in this 
period, from 19 to 21 per cent on the 1 May 2005. 
UK 
56.  Our estimates for the UK show a relatively stable trend in the VAT liability over the 
period 2000–2006.  The VAT gap as a share of liability has also remained fairly stable 
at around 17 per cent from 2000 to 2002, then falling to 15 per cent in 2003 and 2004 
before increasing to 18 per cent in 2005.  We note that the increase between 2004 and 
2005 is led by a slowdown in the growth of receipts rather than due an extraordinary 
increase in estimated liability. 
57.  This observed trend in the VAT gap share is in keeping with the trends in HMRC’s 
own estimates of VAT gap.
3  HMRC’s estimates of VAT gap also show a decline until 
2004 before increasing in 2005.  Significantly, HMRC also estimates that there was a 
sharp rise in MTIC fraud in 2005, which possibly contributed to the rise in the 
estimated gap.    
Sensitivity analysis 
58.  Of the assumption underpinning our top-down estimation of the VAT gap we identify 
four which we expect to have a material impact on our estimate of the VAT gap and 
for which we have limited empirical backing.  Because of this, we think it is of 
interest to examine the impact on our estimates of considering variations to these 
assumptions.  We carry out such a sensitivity analysis on the following:  
(a)  Across all Member States, we assume that 60 per cent of the value of 
intermediate consumption of the financial sector attracts irrecoverable VAT.  
                                                 
3  HMRC (2007) Measuring indirect tax losses, 2007.  Available from http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/pbr2007/mitl.pdf, accessed 
on 3 August 2009. Section 2: Top-down estimates of the VAT gap   
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(b)  Across all Member States, we assume that 80 per cent of the value of 
intermediate consumption of the education sector attracts irrecoverable VAT. 
(c)  For four Member States (Belgium, Italy, Portugal and the UK) we assume that 
half of the gross fixed capital formation on dwellings is accounted for by 
investments in new dwellings and half by expenditure on major improvements to 
existing dwellings.  This assumption is necessary as national VAT legislation 
accords different VAT treatment to the two categories of expenditure and we 
have not found data that allow us to make this split for these countries. 
(d)  Across all Member States, we assume that half of the gross fixed capital 
formation on products within the CPA category “Motor vehicles, trailers and 
semi-trailers” attract VAT that is not recoverable. 
59.  The sensitivity analysis is done by considering other values for the parameter 
associated with each of the assumptions and, for each, calculating the associated VAT 
gap.  The first two assumptions refer to the share of intermediate consumptions by a 
given sector on which VAT is not recoverable; we have denoted this parameter as 
propex.  As an example, and with regard to the first assumption, we examine the 
sensitivity of our results by computing the change in the estimated VAT gap had we 
assumed that the propex associated with the financial sector was 100 per cent, and at 
the other extreme, had we assumed it to be 25 per cent. 
60.  For each Member State we carry out the sensitivity analysis relating to the first two 
assumptions and to the fourth listed above using the most recent year for which use 
tables have been published by Eurostat.  This is to ensure that the sensitivity analysis 
is not vitiated by any possible effects that might arise due to the extrapolation of the 
use tables we carried out.  The exceptions to this are Greece and Latvia as the most 
recent published use tables refer to years prior to 2000 and we have carried out the 
sensitivity on the basis of the data for 2000.  The sensitivity of our results to the third 
assumption listed — on the split of GFCF on dwellings — is done on the basis of 
2006 estimates as the parameter relating to that assumption is applied to data on 
GFCF obtained from Eurostat and hence has no interaction with the extrapolation of 
the use tables.  
Sensitivity to the assumption on the propex of the financial sector 
61.  Our estimates assume that, across all Member States, 60 per cent of the value of the 
intermediate consumption of the financial sector attracts irrecoverable VAT.  That is to 
say, we assume that the value of propex for the financial sector, as defined by NACE 
category “J. Financial intermediaries”, is 60 per cent.  The grounds for this 
assumption are set out in Section 6. 
62.  Table 4 presents the impact on the estimation of the VAT gap for each Member State 
of changing this assumption.  In particular, it reports how the VAT gap would change 
if rather than assuming a propex of 60 per cent we assumed it to be (a) 25 per cent, 
and (b) 100 per cent.  Section 2: Top-down estimates of the VAT gap   
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Table 4  Sensitivity to assumption on propex of the financial services sector 
Percentage points change to VAT gap if 
assume finance propex of  Member State  Year 
VAT gap as a share 
of theoretical 
liability (%)  25 per cent  100 per cent 
AT 2004  12.5%  –1.0 1.0 
BE 2004  12.4%  –1.4 1.4 
CZ 2004  12.5%  –1.0 1.0 
DE 2004  13.8%  –1.2 1.2 
DK 2004  7.1%  –0.7  0.7 
EE 2004  21.3%  –0.3 0.3 
ES 2004  7.9%  –0.7 0.7 
FI 2005  3.8%  –0.9 0.9 
FR 2004  6.7%  –1.5 1.4 
GR 2000  23.8%  –0.5 0.5 
HU 2004  23.7%  –0.7  0.7 
IE 2002  2.6%  –2.0 1.9 
IT 2004  27.5%  –0.7 0.6 
LT 2004  27.6%  –0.3 0.3 
LU 2006  1.0%  –10.3 8.8 
LV 2000  30.6%  –0.6 0.6 
MT 2001  15.5%  –0.5  0.5 
NL 2004  5.6%  –1.4 1.4 
PL 2003  19.9%  –0.9 0.9 
PT 2005  3.0%  –1.4 1.3 
SE 2005  1.9%  –0.8 0.7 
SI 2004  7.8%  –0.7 0.7 
SK 2004  23.7%  –0.5 0.5 
UK 2003  14.3%  –2.7  2.6 
 
63.  As would be expected, changing the assumption on the propex of the financial sector 
has greatest impact for those Member State where this sector is particularly important: 
hence the considerable impact on the estimated VAT gap for Luxembourg and, to a 
much less but still significant extent, for the UK and Ireland.  For most other Member 
States, the rise or fall in the estimated VAT gap of assuming one of the alternate 
values for the parameter would be within 1.5 percentage points of our estimate.  
Sensitivity to the assumption on the propex of the educational sector 
64.  Our estimates assume that the propex attributable to the education sector, NACE code 
“N Education” is 80 per cent; a discussion of this assumption is set out in Section 6.  
We examine the impact on our estimates of the VAT gap if this parameter takes the 
value of 50 per cent, and, alternatively, if we assume it to be 100 per cent.  The results 
are presented in Table 5. Section 2: Top-down estimates of the VAT gap   
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Table 5  Sensitivity to assumption on propex of the education sector 
Percentage points change to VAT gap if 
assume finance propex of  Member State  Year 
VAT gap as a share 
of theoretical 
liability (%)  50 per cent  100 per cent 
AT 2004  12.5%  –0.3 0.2 
BE 2004  12.4%  –0.2 0.1 
CZ 2004  12.5%  –0.5 0.3 
DE 2004  13.8%  –0.3 0.2 
DK 2004  7.1%  –0.6  0.4 
EE 2004  21.3%  –0.5 0.3 
ES 2004  7.9%  –0.3 0.2 
FI 2005  3.8%  –0.5 0.3 
FR 2004  6.7%  –0.4 0.2 
GR 2000  23.8%  –0.1 0.0 
HU 2004  23.7%  –0.4  0.2 
IE 2002  2.6%  –0.3 0.2 
IT 2004  27.5%  –0.2 0.1 
LT 2004  27.6%  –0.2 0.1 
LU 2006  1.0%  –0.2 0.1 
LV 2000  30.6%  –0.5 0.3 
MT 2001  15.5%  –0.2  0.1 
NL 2004  5.6%  –0.3 0.2 
PL 2003  19.9%  –0.3 0.2 
PT 2005  3.0%  –0.3 0.2 
SE 2005  1.9%  –0.6 0.3 
SI 2004  7.8%  –0.5 0.3 
SK 2004  23.7%  –0.2 0.1 
UK 2003  14.3%  –0.6  0.4 
 
65.  The results in Table 5 report that had we assumed the propex of the education sector 
to have been 50 or 100 per cent rather than 80 per cent, our estimate of the share of 
the VAT gap would have changed by at most 0.6 percentage points, and for most 
Member States it would have changed considerably less.    
Sensitivity to the assumption on the split of GFCF on dwellings 
66.  GFCF associated with dwellings is made up of investment in new dwellings and of 
expenditure in major improvements to existing dwellings.  In some Member States, 
different VAT rates apply to the supply of goods or services relating to these two 
activities and, for these Member States, it is necessary to identify the contribution of 
each of the activities.  Whilst we have found disaggregated data that allow us to split 
GFCF between the two types of capital formation for some of the relevant Member 
States, for four of the Member States we have made an assumption about that split.  
This assumption is relevant to Belgium, Italy, Portugal and the UK.  In particular, and Section 2: Top-down estimates of the VAT gap   
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as discussed in Section 6 we assume that each of the two forms of capital formation 
relating to dwellings account for half of the GFCF on dwellings.   
67.  For these Member States, Table 6 reports the impact on the estimated VAT gap under 
two scenarios: first, that the GFCF associated with new dwellings account for 25 per 
cent of total GFCF on dwellings and, second, that the percentage is 75 percent. 
Table 6  Sensitivity to assumption on the split of GFCF on dwellings 
Percentage points change to VAT gap if 
assume ratio of GFCF on new dwellings 
to improvements to existing dwellings  Member State  Year 




BE 2006  11.0%  –2.2 2.2 
IT 2006  22.1%  0.7 –0.8 
PT 2006  4.3% 0.5 –0.5 
UK 2006  17.3%  1.7  –1.7 
 
68.  The impact on the estimated VAT gap of changing the assumption about the split of 
GFCF on dwellings is greatest for Belgium and the UK.  For Belgium, our estimate of 
the VAT gap would be around 2.2 percentage points higher or lower depending on 
which of the alternative values is assumed.  In contrast, the impact of considering the 
more extreme values of the parameter is relatively small for Italy and Portugal. 
Sensitivity to the assumption on the VAT treatment of company cars 
69.  We examine the sensitivity of our estimates of the VAT gap to the assumption on the 
share of gross fixed capital formation in the economy on products of the sector 
“DM34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi–trailers” on which VAT is recoverable.  The 
estimates reported earlier in Table 3 assume that that share is 50 per cent.  Table 7  
below reports the changes to those estimates if that share were assumed to be 25 or 75 
per cent. Section 2: Top-down estimates of the VAT gap   
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Table 7   Sensitivity to assumption on the VAT treatment of company cars 
Percentage points change to VAT gap if 
assume share of GFCF to be not 
recoverable of   Member State  Year 
VAT gap as a share 
of theoretical 
liability (%) 
25 per cent  75 per cent 
AT 2004  12.5%  –0.7 0.7 
BE 2004  12.4%  –0.9 0.9 
CZ 2004  12.5%  –1.4 1.4 
DE 2004  13.8%  –0.7 0.6 
DK 2004  7.1%  –0.6  0.6 
EE 2004  21.3%  –1.3 1.2 
ES 2004  7.9%  –0.9 0.9 
FI 2005  3.8%  –0.4 0.4 
FR 2004  6.7%  –0.6 0.6 
GR 2000  23.8%  –0.6 0.6 
HU 2004  23.7%  –0.7  0.7 
IE 2002  2.6%  –1.3 1.3 
IT 2004  27.5%  –0.6 0.6 
LT 2004  27.6%  –0.5 0.5 
LU 2006  1.0%  –0.8 0.7 
LV 2000  30.6%  –1.2 1.2 
MT 2001  15.5%  –0.2  0.2 
NL 2004  5.6%  –0.8 0.7 
PL 2003  19.9%  –1.1 1.1 
PT 2005  3.0%  –0.6 0.6 
SE 2005  1.9%  –0.8 0.8 
SI 2004  7.8%  –1.0 1.0 
SK 2004  23.7%  –0.6 0.6 
UK 2003  14.3%  –0.3  0.3 
 
70.  As reported in Table 7, our estimates of the VAT gap for the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Ireland, Latvia, Poland and Slovenia are relatively sensitive to this assumption: in 
each of these Member States the estimated VAT gap would change by at most 1.4 
percentage points, and in most cases less than 1 percentage point, if the more extreme 
parameter values were chosen.  
Conclusions on the sensitivity analyses 
71.  We have carried out sensitivity analyses for those assumptions which we expect to 
have a more material impact on our estimates and for which we have relatively 
limited empirical support.  Not surprisingly, the results of the analyses do show that 
each of these assumptions have a material impact on the estimated VAT gap.   
However, the impact is relatively limited with respect to the assumption on company Section 2: Top-down estimates of the VAT gap   
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cars and to the assumption on the propex associated with the education sector; 
typically the estimates are affected by less than 1.5 percentage points.  
72.  We also find that the sensitivity of our results to the assumption on the propex of the 
financial sector is limited for most of the Member States.  The two significant 
exceptions in this regard are the UK and Luxembourg. 
73.  As a final comment on the sensitivity analysis, we note that whilst altering the values 
of the parameters relating to the above assumptions will affect the level of the 
estimated VAT gap as discussed above, we would not expect the trend in the gap to be 
similarly affected.  Rather, the parameter values assumed for a given assumption will 
only affect the trend to the extent that the structure of consumption changes over time. 
Full set of results 
74.  Taking each Member State in turn, we set out over the following pages a chart and 
accompanying table showing the estimates of the estimated VAT liability, receipts and 
VAT gap over the period 2000–2006. 
75.  The tables break down the total estimated VAT liability into the liability associated 
with: 
(a)  household final consumption; 
(b)  gross fixed capital formation; 
(c)  other consumption, which covers government intermediate and final 
consumption and intermediate consumption of other sectors; and 
(d)  the set of adjustments relating to small business exemptions, company cars and 
business entertainment and, for Luxembourg, "tank tourism", and changes in 
valuables. 
76.  The data sources we have used to compile our estimate do not adopt a common 
approach to classifying government expenditure.  For example, gross fixed capital 
formation on private dwellings could be classified as being carried out by households 
in some cases and government or non–financial corporations on others.   
Consequently, we choose not to separately identify the liability arising from 
government expenditure. Section 2: Top-down estimates of the VAT gap   




































































































































































2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Estimated VAT liability
VAT receipts
VAT gap, percentage of liability
Austria
 
Table 8  Austria: VAT receipts, theoretical liability and gap, 2000–2006 (EUR million) 
AT  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2005
† 2006
† 
Total theoretical VAT 
liability    19,295 19,726 19,978 20,585 21,250  22,020  22,844 
Of which           
Household 
consumption   13,038 13,437 13,676 14,067 14,539  15,056  15,654 
Gross fixed capital 
formation   2,570 2,556 2,464 2,545 2,562  2,630  2,772 
Other  consumption    3,288 3,317 3,456 3,536 3,702  3,855  3,966 
Net  adjustments    398 415 381 436 445  479  451 
           
Actual VAT receipts   16,840  17,251 17,972 17,893 18,590  19,414  19,735 
VAT  gap    2,455 2,475 2,006 2,692 2,660  2,606  3,108 
VAT gap as a share of 
theoretical  liability  13% 13% 10% 13% 13%  12%  14% 
† Estimates compiled using forecasted use table data 
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Belgium
 
Table 9  Belgium: VAT receipts, theoretical liability and gap, 2000–2006 (EUR million) 
BE  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2005
† 2006
† 
Total theoretical VAT 
liability    20,224 20,764 21,275 21,829 22,959  24,047  25,360 
Of which           
Household 
consumption   12,414 13,017 13,245 13,669 14,074  14,769  15,531 
Gross fixed capital 
formation   2,554 2,568 2,629 2,465 2,828  2,980  3,202 
Other  consumption    4,341 4,301 4,529 4,823 5,080  5,274  5,530 
Net  adjustments    915 878 872 872 976  1,025  1,096 
           
Actual VAT receipts   18,130  17,817 18,591 18,730 20,122  21,362  22,569 
VAT  gap    2,094 2,946 2,684 3,098 2,837  2,685  2,791 
VAT gap as a share of 
theoretical  liability  10% 14% 13% 14% 12%  11%  11% 
† Estimates compiled using forecasted use table data 
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Estimated VAT liability
VAT receipts
VAT gap, percentage of liability
Czech Republic
 
Table 10  Czech Republic: VAT receipts, theoretical liability and gap, 2000–2006 (CZK million) 
CZ  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2005
† 2006
† 
Total theoretical VAT 
liability    166,392 175,418 185,630 196,790 233,855  244,671  261,196 
Of which           
Household 
consumption   112,156 118,010 121,072 127,426 141,673  140,266  151,190 
Gross fixed capital 
formation   19,530 20,507 24,030 23,273 32,480  37,219  39,817 
Other  consumption    28,683 29,709 31,603 36,291 49,057  55,354  56,400 
Net  adjustments    6,023 7,191 8,925 9,799  10,646  11,832  13,789 
           
Actual VAT receipts   141,341  149,271 155,136 164,250 204,618  215,118  213,728 
VAT  gap    25,051 26,147 30,494 32,540 29,237  29,553  47,468 
VAT gap as a share of 
theoretical  liability  15% 15% 16% 17% 13%  12%  18% 
† Estimates compiled using forecasted use table data 
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VAT receipts
VAT gap, percentage of liability
Germany
 
Table 11  Germany: VAT receipts, theoretical liability and gap, 2000–2006 (EUR million) 
DE  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2005
† 2006
† 
Total theoretical VAT 
liability    158,538 160,460 157,694 158,376 159,352  160,664  164,115 
O f   w h i c h            
Household 
consumption   97,402 101,232 100,174 100,350 102,069  102,464  103,947 
Gross fixed capital 
formation   30,540 28,309 26,863 26,437 26,060  25,819  27,301 
Other  consumption    27,670 28,261 28,314 29,108 28,506  29,750  30,042 
Net  adjustments    2,926 2,657 2,343 2,481 2,717  2,630  2,825 
           
Actual VAT receipts   140,020  139,090 136,810 137,190 137,430  139,810  147,150 
VAT  gap    18,518 21,370 20,884 21,186 21,922  20,854  16,965 
VAT gap as a share of 
theoretical  liability  12% 13% 13% 13% 14%  13%  10% 
† Estimates compiled using forecasted use table data 
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Table 12  Denmark: VAT receipts, theoretical liability and gap, 2000–2006 (DKK million) 
DK  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2005  2006
† 
Total theoretical VAT 
liability    135,645 140,878 143,523 145,160 154,301  163,228  176,119 
Of which           
Household 
consumption   81,768 83,562 86,080 86,885 92,828  96,522  102,746 
Gross fixed capital 
formation   19,398 20,309 19,089 19,094 19,943  22,139  25,311 
Other  consumption    29,929 32,368 33,867 34,829 37,047  39,637  42,930 
Net  adjustments    4,551 4,639 4,487 4,352 4,483  4,930  5,132 
           
Actual VAT receipts   123,777  128,550 132,394 135,088 143,277  155,463  168,276 
VAT gap   11,868  12,328  11,129  10,072  11,024  7,765  7,843 
VAT gap as a share of 
theoretical  liability  9% 9% 8% 7% 7%  5%  4% 
†  Estimates compiled using forecasted use table data. Revised estimates for Denmark calculated with use tables 
downloaded from Eurostat in July 2009. 
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Estonia
 
Table 13  Estonia: VAT receipts, theoretical liability and gap, 2000–2006 (EEK million) 
EE  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2005
† 2006
† 
Total theoretical VAT 
liability    9,267 10,652 12,033 13,301 14,790  16,692  20,739 
Of which           
Household 
consumption   6,571 7,436 8,272 9,155  10,239  11,364  13,589 
Gross fixed capital 
formation   1,071 1,347 1,714 1,888 2,216  2,850  4,004 
Other  consumption    1,482 1,663 1,797 2,001 2,050  2,341  2,748 
Net  adjustments    143 206 251 257 285  137  399 
           
Actual VAT receipts   8,142  8,892  10,178 11,141 11,638  15,176  19,009 
VAT  gap    1,125 1,760 1,855 2,160 3,152  1,516  1,731 
VAT gap as a share of 
theoretical  liability  12% 17% 15% 16% 21% 9%  8% 
† Estimates compiled using forecasted use table data 
 Section 2: Top-down estimates of the VAT gap   
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Estimated VAT liability
VAT receipts
VAT gap, percentage of liability
Spain
 
Table 14  Spain: VAT receipts, theoretical liability and gap, 2000–2006 (EUR million) 
ES 2000  2001  2002
† 2003
† 2004  2005
† 2006
† 
Total theoretical VAT 
liability    41,565 44,525 47,265 50,397 54,363  58,599  63,013 
Of which           
Household 
consumption   28,804 30,614 32,028 33,698 36,067  38,553  41,028 
Gross fixed capital 
formation   6,178 6,878 7,431 8,254 8,989  9,885  10,766 
Other  consumption    5,608 6,042 6,746 7,316 8,094  8,857  9,816 
Net adjustments   975  991  1,060  1,130  1,211  1,305  1,403 
           
Actual VAT receipts   37,640  39,117 41,475 45,915 50,084  56,197  61,595 
VAT  gap    3,925 5,408 5,790 4,482 4,278  2,402  1,418 
VAT gap as a share of 
theoretical  liability  9% 12% 12%  9%  8% 4%  2% 
† Estimates compiled using forecasted use table data 
 Section 2: Top-down estimates of the VAT gap   
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Estimated VAT liability
VAT receipts
VAT gap, percentage of liability
Finland
 
Table 15  Finland: VAT receipts, theoretical liability and gap, 2000–2006 (EUR million) 
FI  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2005  2006
† 
Total theoretical VAT 
liability    11,099 11,599 12,210 13,048 13,589  14,195  15,176 
Of which           
Household 
consumption   6,518 6,833 7,128 7,587 7,853  8,149  8,661 
Gross fixed capital 
formation   1,653 1,663 1,731 1,874 1,990  2,112  2,248 
Other  consumption    2,816 2,966 3,193 3,387 3,538  3,683  3,967 
Net  adjustments    111 137 158 199 209  252  300 
           
Actual VAT receipts   10,869  11,118 11,680 12,455 12,949  13,658  14,418 
VAT  gap    230 481 530 593 640  537  758 
VAT gap as a share of 
theoretical  liability  2% 4% 4% 5% 5%  4%  5% 
† Estimates compiled using forecasted use table data 
 Section 2: Top-down estimates of the VAT gap   
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Estimated VAT liability
VAT receipts
VAT gap, percentage of liability
France
 
Table 16  France: VAT receipts, theoretical liability and gap, 2000–2006 (EUR million) 
FR  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2005
† 2006
† 
Total theoretical VAT 
liability    111,119 114,078 117,990 122,180 127,879  133,793  140,817 
Of which           
Household 
consumption   71,008 73,075 75,250 77,614 80,661  83,530  86,440 
Gross fixed capital 
formation   17,780 17,942 18,284 19,416 20,694  22,184  23,896 
Other  consumption    19,751 20,451 21,854 22,542 23,727  25,149  27,326 
Net  adjustments    2,579 2,610 2,603 2,608 2,797  2,930  3,154 
           
Actual VAT receipts   105,887  107,465 109,353 112,460 119,294  125,768  131,017 
VAT  gap    5,231 6,613 8,637 9,720 8,585  8,025  9,800 
VAT gap as a share of 
theoretical  liability  5% 6% 7% 8% 7%  6%  7% 
† Estimates compiled using forecasted use table data 
 Section 2: Top-down estimates of the VAT gap   

































































































































































2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Estimated VAT liability
VAT receipts
VAT gap, percentage of liability
Greece
 









Total theoretical VAT 
liability    12,900 13,737 14,942 16,410 17,666  19,456  21,746 
Of which           
Household 
consumption   8,199 8,792 9,381  10,100  10,828  12,229  13,385 
Gross fixed capital 
formation   2,973 3,169 3,536 4,169 4,569  4,795  5,707 
Other  consumption    1,501 1,530 1,744 1,809 1,900  2,025  2,165 
Net  adjustments    226 246 281 332 369  407  490 
           
Actual VAT receipts   9,824  10,960  11,969 12,043 12,573  13,398  15,183 
VAT  gap    3,076 2,777 2,973 4,367 5,093  6,058  6,563 
VAT gap as a share of 
theoretical  liability  24% 20% 20% 27% 29%  31%  30% 
† Estimates compiled using forecasted use table data 
 Section 2: Top-down estimates of the VAT gap   
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Estimated VAT liability
VAT receipts
VAT gap, percentage of liability
Hungary
 
Table 18  Hungary: VAT receipts, theoretical liability and gap, 2000–2006 (HUF million) 
HU  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2005
† 2006
† 
Total theoretical VAT 
liability    1,366,496 1,584,177 1,780,756 1,941,165 2,399,106  2,483,996  2,347,243 
Of which           
Household 
consumption   916,738 1,036,046 1,118,808 1,258,368 1,559,005  1,584,940  1,467,214 
Gross fixed capital 
formation   232,003 293,011 363,193 351,705 411,850  414,325  382,406 
Other  consumption    185,652 219,086 256,641 287,871 385,306  441,378  452,785 
Net  adjustments    32,103 36,035 42,115 43,222 42,945  43,353  44,837 
           
Actual VAT receipts   1,159,959  1,230,216  1,340,914 1,539,868 1,831,647  1,856,547  1,800,345 
VAT  gap    206,537 353,961 439,842 401,297 567,459  627,449  546,898 
VAT gap as a share of 
theoretical  liability  15% 22% 25% 21% 24%  25%  23% 
† Estimates compiled using forecasted use table data 
 Section 2: Top-down estimates of the VAT gap   
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Estimated VAT liability
VAT receipts
VAT gap, percentage of liability
Ireland
 
Table 19  Ireland: VAT receipts, theoretical liability and gap, 2000–2006 (EUR million) 





Total theoretical VAT 
liability    8,096 8,521 9,415  10,509  11,385  12,750  14,043 
Of which           
Household 
consumption   4,526 4,668 5,121 5,716 6,033  6,574  7,091 
Gross fixed capital 
formation   2,060 2,094 2,324 2,656 3,074  3,637  4,192 
Other  consumption    1,139 1,413 1,569 1,673 1,783  1,939  2,098 
Net  adjustments    372 348 400 464 494  600  662 
           
Actual VAT receipts   7,657  7,999 9,168 9,814  10,947  12,364  13,802 
VAT  gap    440 523 247 694 437  386  241 
VAT gap as a share of 
theoretical  liability  5% 6% 3% 7% 4%  3%  2% 
† Estimates compiled using forecasted use table data 
 Section 2: Top-down estimates of the VAT gap   
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Estimated VAT liability
VAT receipts
VAT gap, percentage of liability
Italy
 
Table 20  Italy: VAT receipts, theoretical liability and gap, 2000–2006 (EUR million) 
IT  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2005
† 2006
† 
Total theoretical VAT 
liability    99,869 103,362 106,055 109,046 112,358  115,646  119,197 
Of which           
Household 
consumption   73,284 75,101 76,650 78,534 80,889  82,549  85,070 
Gross fixed capital 
formation   9,552 10,103 10,460 11,058 11,384  11,925  12,309 
Other  consumption    13,121 14,283 15,086 15,783 16,184  17,327  17,809 
Net  adjustments    3,913 3,876 3,859 3,671 3,902  3,845  4,009 
           
Actual VAT receipts   77,473  78,056 80,382 79,099 81,515  85,317  92,860 
VAT  gap    22,396 25,306 25,673 29,947 30,843  30,329  26,337 
VAT gap as a share of 
theoretical  liability  22% 24% 24% 27% 27%  26%  22% 
† Estimates compiled using forecasted use table data 
 Section 2: Top-down estimates of the VAT gap   
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Estimated VAT liability
VAT receipts
VAT gap, percentage of liability
Lithuania
 
Table 21  Lithuania: VAT receipts, theoretical liability and gap, 2000–2006 (LTL million) 
LT  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2005
† 2006
† 
Total theoretical VAT 
liability    4,105 4,440 4,684 4,989 5,608  6,583  8,063 
Of which           
Household 
consumption   3,091 3,365 3,494 3,789 4,267  5,057  6,006 
Gross fixed capital 
formation   441 468 541 617 763  828  1,215 
Other  consumption    541 551 602 541 513  623  745 
Net  adjustments    32 56 47 42 64  74  98 
           
Actual VAT receipts   3,471  3,544 3,843 3,836 4,059  5,138  6,303 
VAT gap   635  895  841  1,154  1,549  1,445  1,760 
VAT gap as a share of 
theoretical  liability  15% 20% 18% 23% 28%  22%  22% 
† Estimates compiled using forecasted use table data 
 Section 2: Top-down estimates of the VAT gap   































































































































































2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Estimated VAT liability
VAT receipts
VAT gap, percentage of liability
Luxembourg
 
Table 22  Luxembourg: VAT receipts, theoretical liability and gap, 2000–2006 (EUR million) 
LU  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2005  2006 
Total theoretical VAT 
liability    1,397 1,446 1,454 1,526 1,690  1,927  1,961 
Of which           
Household 
consumption   730 747 806 811 881  951  962 
Gross fixed capital 
formation   214 224 219 216 215  215  221 
Other  consumption    324 356 356 370 446  497  566 
Net adjustments*   129  118  73  129  147  264  211 
           
Actual VAT receipts   1,234  1,314 1,383 1,467 1,654  1,838  1,941 
VAT  gap    163  133 71 59 36  90  20 
VAT gap as a share of 
theoretical  liability  12% 9% 5% 4% 2%  5%  1% 
*Includes estimated VAT liability from “tank tourism” by business vehicles 
 Section 2: Top-down estimates of the VAT gap   
































































































































































2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Estimated VAT liability
VAT receipts
VAT gap, percentage of liability
Latvia
 









Total theoretical VAT 
liability    482 518 562 647 753  949  1,219 
Of which           
Household 
consumption   324 358 395 475 548  667  869 
Gross fixed capital 
formation   48 43 50 51 65  122  150 
Other  consumption    94 96 91 89 94  91  102 
Net  adjustments    17 22 26 32 46  69  98 
           
Actual  VAT  receipts    335 351 384 461 519  704  956 
VAT  gap    148 167 178 186 235  245  263 
VAT gap as a share of 
theoretical  liability  31% 32% 32% 29% 31%  26%  22% 
† Estimates compiled using forecasted use table data Section 2: Top-down estimates of the VAT gap   
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Estimated VAT liability
VAT receipts
VAT gap, percentage of liability
Malta
 
Table 24  Malta: VAT receipts, theoretical liability and gap, 2000–2006 (MTL million) 






Total theoretical VAT 
liability    124 132 133 145 166  182  199 
Of which           
Household 
consumption   81 87 86 90  109  114  117 
Gross fixed capital 
formation   18 21 22 27 26  33  37 
Other  consumption    22 20 23 25 28  33  41 
Net  adjustments    3 3 2 2 3  3  4 
           
Actual VAT receipts*   103  111  128  117  143  171  176 
VAT  gap    22 20  5 28 23  12  23 
VAT gap as a share of 
theoretical  liability  17% 16%  4% 19% 14% 6%  11% 
† Estimates compiled using forecasted use table data  *Eurostat data in EUR converted to MTL using a fixed exchange 
rate of 1 EUR = 0.4293 MTL. 
 Section 2: Top-down estimates of the VAT gap   





























































































































































2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Estimated VAT liability
VAT receipts
VAT gap, percentage of liability
Netherlands
 
Table 25  Netherlands: VAT receipts, theoretical liability and gap, 2000–2006 (EUR million) 
NL  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2005
† 2006
† 
Total theoretical VAT 
liability    30,873 35,457 36,752 37,163 37,951  39,571  41,269 
Of which           
Household 
consumption   16,419 18,928 19,679 19,514 19,945  20,537  20,780 
Gross fixed capital 
formation   7,565 7,722 7,856 8,272 8,179  8,674  9,380 
Other  consumption    6,194 7,964 8,451 8,640 9,013  9,534  10,222 
Net  adjustments    695 843 766 738 815  826  887 
           
Actual VAT receipts   28,849  32,509 33,493 34,754 35,811  36,950  39,888 
VAT  gap    2,024 2,948 3,259 2,409 2,140  2,621  1,381 
VAT gap as a share of 
theoretical  liability  7% 8% 9% 6% 6%  7%  3% 
† Estimates compiled using forecasted use table data 
 Section 2: Top-down estimates of the VAT gap   
































































































































































2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Estimated VAT liability
VAT receipts
VAT gap, percentage of liability
Poland
 
Table 26  Poland: VAT receipts, theoretical liability and gap, 2000–2006 (PLN million) 
PL 2000  2001




Total theoretical VAT 
liability    65,811 69,506 72,820 75,136 81,530  85,643  92,660 
Of which           
Household 
consumption   45,498 47,614 50,844 51,281 55,894  58,221  61,789 
Gross fixed capital 
formation   6,850 6,794 6,492 6,610 7,877  8,393  9,400 
Other  consumption    11,254 12,983 13,697 14,923 15,526  16,642  18,687 
Net  adjustments    2,209 2,116 1,787 2,323 2,233  2,387  2,783 
           
Actual VAT receipts   51,615  52,810 58,115 60,212 66,242  75,783  86,203 
VAT  gap    14,196 16,696 14,705 14,924 15,288 9,860  6,457 
VAT gap as a share of 
theoretical  liability  22% 24% 20% 20% 19%  12%  7% 
† Estimates compiled using forecasted use table data 
 Section 2: Top-down estimates of the VAT gap   
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Estimated VAT liability
VAT receipts
VAT gap, percentage of liability
Portugal
 
Table 27  Portugal: VAT receipts, theoretical liability and gap, 2000–2006 (EUR million) 
PT  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2005  2006
† 
Total theoretical VAT 
liability    10,241 10,737 11,549 11,861 12,571  13,403  14,371 
Of which           
Household 
consumption   6,759 7,085 7,663 7,927 8,318  8,931  9,540 
Gross fixed capital 
formation   1,249 1,313 1,401 1,330 1,461  1,382  1,571 
Other  consumption    1,880 2,005 2,163 2,298 2,464  2,740  2,923 
Net  adjustments    354 334 323 305 328  350  338 
           
Actual VAT receipts   9,734  10,021  10,690 11,092 11,574  13,006  13,757 
VAT  gap    508 716 859 769 997  397  614 
VAT gap as a share of 
theoretical  liability  5% 7% 7% 6% 8%  3%  4% 
† Estimates compiled using forecasted use table data 
 Section 2: Top-down estimates of the VAT gap   
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Estimated VAT liability
VAT receipts
VAT gap, percentage of liability
Sweden
 
Table 28  Sweden: VAT receipts, theoretical liability and gap, 2000–2006 (SEK million) 
SE  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2005  2006
† 
Total theoretical VAT 
liability    208,030 216,982 225,179 234,229 243,455  256,213  271,100 
Of which           
Household 
consumption   121,518 126,116 130,748 136,713 141,294  147,213  153,978 
Gross fixed capital 
formation   19,575 20,365 22,098 22,880 24,772  28,507  31,458 
Other  consumption    59,985 63,342 65,356 67,220 69,520  72,357  76,852 
Net  adjustments    6,952 7,159 6,977 7,415 7,869  8,136  8,812 
           
Actual VAT receipts   194,860  204,629 215,697 225,145 233,966  251,309  263,632 
VAT  gap    13,170  12,353 9,482 9,084 9,489  4,904  7,468 
VAT gap as a share of 
theoretical  liability  6% 6% 4% 4% 4%  2%  3% 
† Estimates compiled using forecasted use table data 
 Section 2: Top-down estimates of the VAT gap   
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VAT receipts
VAT gap, percentage of liability
Slovenia
 
Table 29  Slovenia: VAT receipts, theoretical liability and gap, 2000–2006 (EUR million) 
SI  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2005  2006
† 
Total theoretical VAT 
liability    1,902 2,055 2,268 2,336 2,508  2,699  2,764 
Of which           
Household 
consumption   1,242 1,316 1,435 1,513 1,636  1,747  1,763 
Gross fixed capital 
formation   296 358 405 387 430  478  523 
Other  consumption    298 309 353 357 361  390  390 
Net  adjustments    66 72 75 79 81  84  87 
           
Actual VAT receipts   1,599  1,718 1,982 2,140 2,311  2,472  2,647 
VAT  gap    303 337 287 195 197  227  116 
VAT gap as a share of 
theoretical  liability  16% 16% 13%  8%  8% 8%  4% 
† Estimates compiled using forecasted use table data Section 2: Top-down estimates of the VAT gap   
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VAT receipts
VAT gap, percentage of liability
Slovakia
 
Table 30  Slovakia: VAT receipts, theoretical liability and gap, 2000–2006 (SKK million) 
SK  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004  2005
† 2006
† 
Total theoretical VAT 
liability   89,365  98,705  106,506 116,139 138,493  154,476  172,477 
Of which           
Household 
consumption   59,698 66,723 71,816 79,127 97,219  103,957  113,591 
Gross fixed capital 
formation   11,354 11,600 12,934 12,694 14,421  17,721  21,445 
Other  consumption    15,872 17,297 18,654 22,062 24,396  30,194  34,739 
Net  adjustments    2,441 3,086 3,102 2,256 2,457  2,604  2,702 
           
Actual VAT receipts*   65,301  73,938 77,779 91,324  105,649  116,880  123,628 
VAT  gap    24,064 24,767 28,727 24,815 32,844  37,596  48,848 
VAT gap as a share of 
theoretical  liability  27% 25% 27% 21% 24%  24%  28% 
† Estimates compiled using forecasted use table data  *Eurostat data in EUR converted to SKK using a fixed exchange 
rate of 1 EUR = 30.1260 SKK. 
 Section 2: Top-down estimates of the VAT gap   
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United Kingdom
 
Table 31  United Kingdom: VAT receipts, theoretical liability and gap, 2000–2006 (GBP million)   




Total theoretical VAT 
liability    76,500 80,449 85,348 90,287 95,559  101,646  106,143 
Of which           
Household 
consumption   51,836 54,200 57,201 59,909 62,915  65,374  68,018 
Gross fixed capital 
formation   4,748 5,150 5,800 6,485 7,277  8,098  9,421 
Other  consumption    18,370 19,722 21,100 22,583 23,891  27,301  27,780 
Net  adjustments    1,546 1,378 1,246 1,310 1,476 872 924 
           
Actual VAT receipts   64,202  67,100 71,066 77,343 81,550  83,415  87,753 
VAT  gap    12,298 13,349 14,282 12,944 14,009  18,231  18,390 
VAT gap as a share of 
theoretical  liability  16% 17% 17% 14% 15%  18%  17% 
† Estimates compiled using forecasted use table data Section 3: Econometric analysis of the VAT gap   
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SECTION 3: ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF THE VAT GAP 
77.  This section presents an econometric analysis of the VAT gap. 
78.  The aim of the analysis is to contribute to the understanding of the nature and causes 
of the VAT gap, and to identify country characteristics that appear related to different 
levels of the VAT gap. 
79.  This section is structured as follows: 
(a)  First, we review published econometric studies of the causes of the VAT gap. 
(b)  Second, we provide an empirical analysis of the VAT gap figures obtained by the 
top–down method reported elsewhere in this report. 
Previous econometric studies of the determinants of the VAT gap 
80.  Before presenting our own empirical analysis, we review the findings from other 
studies on the topic.  This review informs the choice of candidate explanatory 
variables used in our own models. 
81.  There have been few investigations of the determinants of VAT losses. 
82.  Christie and Holzner (2006) did not include a review of other similar papers “there is 
typically no econometric modelling involved at all” within the studies that measure 
the size of tax evasion.
4  Keen and Smith (2007) suggest that “the difficulty of 
measuring VAT noncompliance […] has impeded serious empirical work” on the 
determinants of the VAT gap.
5   
83.  Keen and Smith (2007) comment on only one study that provided an econometric 
analysis of the determinants of VAT compliance.  This paper is Agha and Houghton 
(1996) which constructs and analyses a cross–section of VAT compliance rates for 17 
OECD member countries in 1987.
6 
84.  Agha and Houghton (1996) found that: 
(a)  a higher VAT rate is associated with lower VAT compliance; 
(b)  the number of VAT rates negatively affect the level of VAT compliance; 
(c)  VAT compliance increases the longer VAT has been in operation; and 
(d)  smaller countries (in terms of population) tend to have higher levels of 
compliance.   
                                                 
4  Christie, E and M. Holzner (2006) “What explains tax evasion? An empirical assessment based on European data”, WIIW 
Working Paper 40.  Available from http://www.wiiw.ac.at/pdf/wp40.pdf, accessed on 3 August 2009. 
5  Keen, M and S. Smith (2007) “VAT fraud and evasion: What do we know, and what can be done?”, IMF Working Paper.  
Available from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=964339, accessed on 3 August 2009. 
6  Agha, A and J. Haughton (1996) “Designing VAT systems: Some efficiency considerations”, The Review of Economics 
and Statistics 78, No.2, pp. 303-308 Section 3: Econometric analysis of the VAT gap   
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85.  Other factors, including the VAT base as a proportion of GDP, the severity of penalties 
for late payment, and the proportion of the population registered to pay VAT, had no 
statistically significant impact on compliance.   
86.  We have found two other studies which provide econometric analysis of the VAT gap. 
87.  Otranto, Pisano and Polidoro (2003) examines the determinants of VAT fraud in Italy 
in the period 1982–2001.
7  The authors find that VAT evasion is positively affected by 
GDP, by the share of the fiscal burden and by the ratio of gross profits and value 
added over the economy, and that it is negatively affected by one period lagged values 
of the number of taxpayers checked by the authorities.  The authors also find that 
initiatives by government to grant amnesty to tax evaders in a given period have a 
negative and only transitory effect on the level of the VAT gap.  
88.  Christie and Holzner (2006) analyses data for 29 European countries from 2000 to 
2003.
8  The effects on VAT compliance identified by this paper are as follows: 
(a)  a higher weighted average VAT rate reduces VAT compliance; 
(b)  greater judicial and legal effectiveness increases VAT compliance; 
(c)  countries where citizens want more power for local authorities (which is, 
according to the authors, a proxy for tax morale) tend to have lower levels of 
VAT compliance; and  
(d)  countries with a large proportion of GDP from travel revenues tend to have 
higher levels of VAT compliance.   
89.  Christie and Holzner (2006) found that other factors, such as the confidence in the 
health care system, measures of income inequality, a measure of poverty, complexity 
of the VAT system, a corruption index, and GDP per capita, did not have a statistically 
significant relationship to the estimated rate of VAT compliance. 
Empirical modelling of top–down VAT gap estimates 
90.  We draw on some of the ideas found in the literature to develop our own econometric 
analysis of the determinants of the estimated VAT gap. 
Data used in the modelling 
91.  The dependent variable for our econometric analysis is the VAT gap share, defined as 
the VAT gap divided by the theoretical VAT liability.  Data for this variable come from 
our top–down analysis reported in Section 2. 
                                                 
7  Otranto, E., S. Pisani and F. Polidoro (2003) “Un modello statistico per comprendere le determinanti dell’evasione” in R. 
Convenevole and S. Pisani “Le basi imponibili IVA Un’analisi del periodo 1982-2001”, Working paper 2003/1 of Agenzia 
Entrate, Ministerio dell’Economia e della Finanze, Italy.  Available from 
http://www1.agenziaentrate.it/ufficiostudi/pdf/2003/basi%20imponibili%20IVA%2082-01.pdf , accessed on 3 August 
2009. 
8  Christie, E and M. Holzner (2006) “What explains tax evasion? An empirical assessment based on European data”, WIIW 
Working Paper 40.  Available from http://www.wiiw.ac.at/pdf/wp40.pdf, accessed on 3 August 2009. Section 3: Econometric analysis of the VAT gap   
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92.  This variable measures the proportion of theoretical liability that is not remitted. 
Table 32   Candidate explanatory variables 
Variable  Underlying factor(s) 




Proxy for the punishment rate 
and the audit rate and may be 
an indicator of the shadow 
economy 
Kaufman (2004), “Corruption, Governance 
and Security: Challenges for the Rich 
Countries and the World”,  Chapter in the 
World Bank’s Global Competitiveness 
Report 2004/2005 
Proportion of population who 
think that it is unjustifiable to 
cheat on taxes if you have a 
chance 
Moral standards  1999 wave of the World Values Survey
9.  
(Proportion of answers 1–5 for the question 
F116) 
Transparency International 
Corruption Perceptions Index  
Level of corruption  Transparency International’s annual 
Corruption Perceptions Index report 
Theoretical VAT liability 
divided by GDP 
VAT burden  Reckon’s top–down analysis and Eurostat 
Standard VAT rate  VAT burden  National VAT legislation 
GINI coefficient (measure of 
income inequality) 
Income inequality  Eurostat (income and living conditions 
indicators) 
UK data taken from its national statistics 
office 
At risk of poverty rate (cut–off 
point: 60% of median 
equivalised income after social 
transfers) 
Poverty  Eurostat (income and living conditions 
indicators) 
UK data taken from the Institute of Fiscal 
Studies 
GDP per capita (EUR in 1995 
prices) 
Wealth/level of development  Eurostat (national accounts) 
Unemployment rate  Income inequality / poverty  Eurostat (EU Labour Force Survey) 
Government final consumption 
expenditure divided by GDP 
Overall tax burden / level of 
government controls 
(including tax inspections) 
Eurostat (national accounts) 
GDP (Euros in 1995 prices)  Size of the economy  Eurostat (national accounts) 
Population  Country size  Eurostat 
EU membership (dummy 
variable) 
EU membership might make 
certain types of fraud easier 
(e.g. MTIC).  Conversely, EU 
membership might coincide 
with a crack down on VAT 
fraud.   
Takes the value 1 if the country is the EU, 
and zero otherwise.  10 countries joined on 
1 May 2004; variable pro–rated for the year 
2004 
                                                 
9  European Values Study Group and World Values Survey Association.  European and World Values Surveys Four Wave 
Integrated Data File, 1981-2004, v.20060423, 2006. Aggregate File Producers: Análisis Sociológicos Económicos y 
Políticos (ASEP) and JD Systems (JDS), Madrid, Spain/Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands. Data Files 
Suppliers: Analisis Sociologicos Economicos y Politicos (ASEP) and JD Systems (JDS), Madrid, Spain/Tillburg 
University, Tilburg, The Netherlands/ Zentralarchiv fur Empirische Sozialforschung (ZA), Cologne, Germany:) Aggregate 
File Distributors: Análisis Sociológicos Económicos y Políticos (ASEP) and JD Systems (JDS), Madrid, Spain/Tilburg 
University, Tilburg, The Netherlands/Zentralarchiv fur Empirische Sozialforschung (ZA) Cologne, Germany. Section 3: Econometric analysis of the VAT gap   
www.reckon.co.uk  50 
Variable  Underlying factor(s) 
captured by the variable 
Source 
EU accession (dummy variable)  Countries might have stepped 
up enforcement on joining the 
EU. 
Takes the value 1 after accession, pro–rated 
for time as necessary, for the 10 countries 
that joined the EU in 2004; and 0 in all 
other cases 
Effect of EU–10 accession on 
the EU–15 (dummy variable) 
Impact of an enlarged EU  Takes the value 1 after accession by the 
EU–10, pro–rated for time as necessary, for 
the 15 countries that joined the EU before 
2004; and 0 in all other cases 
Gross fixed capital formation of 
construction products divided 
by GDP 
Relative size of the 
construction sector 
Eurostat (national accounts) 
Household final consumption of 
hotel and restaurant services 
divided by GDP 
Proxy for the effect of tourism  Eurostat (national accounts) 
 
93.  VAT gap estimates were available for all countries from 2000 to 2006 for 24 of the 25 
countries covered by this study.  There are no VAT gap estimates for Cyprus. 
94.  Table 32 lists the candidate explanatory variables that we have considered, a short 
description of the reason for their inclusion and the source from which they were 
obtained.  Several of these variables have been used in the Agha and Houghton (1996) 
and Christie and Holzner (2006) studies mentioned earlier.   
95.  Two of the variables in Table 32 are not available on a time series basis.  The 
judicial/legal effectiveness index and the variable about how justifiable it is to cheat 
on taxes are both available for a single year only.  In our modelling we have assumed 
that these variables are constant over time for each country. 
96.  Some of the other variables had missing values for some years and countries: 
(a)  The Gini coefficient and the poverty rate both had missing entries for some 
countries and years.  These gaps were filled in using the fitted values of a 
country–specific regression of the variable in question on time. 
(b)  Malta has no data for the corruption perceptions index and judicial/legal 
effectiveness index. 
(c)  Eurostat reported no Gini coefficient and poverty rate variables for Slovakia. 
97.  Where there were missing values for a variable, the observations affected were not 
included in the estimation of models using that variable. 
Econometric analysis — general considerations 
98.  The general form of the models that we considered is as follows: 
VAT gap share(i,t) = a + b1X1(i,t)  + …+ bkXk(i,t) + e(i,t) Section 3: Econometric analysis of the VAT gap   
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99.  In this equation, i denotes the country, t the year, a is a constant, the b coefficients are 
the slopes on the explanatory variables X, and e is the model’s disturbance term.   
100.  The starting point for our analysis was to estimate a random effects model.  A model 
of this type decomposes the disturbance into a country-specific component (the 
random effect) that is fixed over time and an unrelated noise component that is not 
correlated over time or between countries.   
101.  We do not report results from fixed effects models, in which a specific intercept term 
would be included for each country.  The inclusion of such intercept terms would 
mask the effect of any explanatory variables that are constant over time or very close 
to being constant over time even though there may be large differences between 
countries.  Given that we are interested in the estimated effects of such variables, a 
fixed effects model does not contribute to our analysis. 
102.  The estimated effect of the explanatory variables in a random effects model are only 
unbiased if the random effects are not correlated with the explanatory variables.  A 
method that can be used to test whether this is the case is the Hausman test.  This test 
compares the estimated results of a fixed effects model and a random effects model.  
The more different the coefficients obtained by both methods are, the more likely it is 
that the assumption of no correlation between random effects and explanatory 
variable has been violated.   
103.  A further important assumption is that the random effect estimates are based on the 
hypothesis that the noise component of the disturbance term in the model is 
homoskedastic (i.e. has a constant variance) and is not autocorrelated.  When 
hetereskedasticity or autocorrelation are present the estimated standard errors can lead 
to misleading inferences about statistical significance. 
104.  We have used a general-to-specific approach to identifying those variables that exhibit 
a not-insignificant relationship with the VAT gap share.  This approach involves 
starting with the most general model, including all the candidate explanatory 
variables.  We then drop variables from the model, one at a time, starting with the one 
that has the highest p value.  We stop when each remaining variable is significant at a 
level of 95 per cent.   
Random effects estimates 
105.  Table 33 shows the results of estimating a random effects model over the period 2000-
2006 using a general-to-specific approach.  It also includes the results of diagnostic 
tests. 
106.  Data for only 23 countries are used, as: 
(a)  There were no VAT gap data for Cyprus. 
(b)  There was no judicial/legal effectiveness index for Malta. Section 3: Econometric analysis of the VAT gap   
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107.  We have tried fitting models without the explanatory variables for which data are 
missing; we did not find any case in which the results were qualitatively different 
from those in Table 33. 
Table 33  Random effects model results 
Dependent variable:  VAT gap divided by the theoretical VAT liability (proportion) 
Explanatory variables:  Coefficient Standard  error 
Constant 0.152  0.071 
Judicial/legal effectiveness index divided 
by 100 (0–1) 
–0.212 0.042 
EU accession (dummy variable)  –0.044  0.009 
Impact of EU enlargement in 2004  –0.012  0.006 
VAT liability as a proportion of GDP  3.313  0.654 
Standard VAT rate  0.008  0.003 
Number of observations: 161  Number of countries: 23  Statistical indicators: 
Overall R-squared: 0.6308   
Hausman test statistic: 2.0 
(p = 0.7359) 
Likelihood ratio test for 
heteroskedasticity: 115.95 
(p = 0.000) 
Diagnostic tests 
Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation: 34.815 
(p = 0.000) 
 
 
108.  For this model, the Hausman test was passed.  This suggests that there is low risk of a 
bias in the estimated coefficients as a result of correlations between the random 
effects and the explanatory variables.   
109.  One explanatory variable that might have been expected to display such correlation is 
the VAT liability as a proportion of GDP (i.e. the VAT burden).  This is because errors 
in estimating a country’s theoretical VAT liability, and therefore its VAT gap, affect 
the measure of the VAT burden for that country.  This is what is termed in 
econometrics an endogeneity problem. 
110.  The Hausman test however does not rule out the possibility of correlations between 
the VAT burden and the noise component of the disturbance.  This issue is discussed 
later in this section. 
111.  We tested for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation: 
(a)  We carried out a likelihood ratio test in which the null hypothesis is that the 
noise term has a constant variance across countries was rejected.  This suggests 
the presence of heteroskedasticity. 
(b)  We carried out the Wooldridge test, where the null hypothesis is of no first-order 
autocorrelation was rejected.  This suggests the presence of autocorrelation in the 
noise term. Section 3: Econometric analysis of the VAT gap   
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112.  These two tests indicate that assumptions behind the random effects model are not 
satisfied in this case and that the estimated standard errors cannot be relied upon for 
statistical testing.  Christie and Holzner (2006) reached similar findings when they 
carried out these tests on their estimated random effects model.   
113.  To take account of the detected heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation an alternative 
modelling approach is required, one that is robust to these features.  We have used 
two different estimation techniques to accomplish this: 
(a)  Panel corrected standard errors in conjunction with assuming a disturbance term 
with first-order autocorrelation.
10  This was the approach adopted by Christie and 
Holzner (2006).  
(b)  Estimating the model by ordinary least squares and then adjusting the standard 
errors so that they are “robust” to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.
11  This 
approach does not specify the form of the autocorrelation and instead uses the 
correlation detected in the data itself to estimate the standard errors.   
114.  When applying these techniques we again took a general-to-specific modelling 
approach.   
Panel corrected standard error estimates 
115.  Table 34 presents the results of our modelling using the panel corrected standard 
errors approach. 
Table 34   Panel corrected standard error modelling results 
Dependent variable:  VAT gap divided by the theoretical VAT liability (proportion) 
Explanatory variables:  Coefficient  Panel corrected standard error 
Constant 0.217  0.068 
Corruption Perceptions Index (0–
10, a lower score represents a 
higher perception of corruption)  
–.024 0.002 
Gross fixed capital formation of 
construction products divided by 
GDP 
–0.399 0.672 
Theoretical VAT liability divided 
by GDP (proportion) 
2.725 0.697 
Standard VAT rate  –0.006  0.002 
Population (millions)  0.522  0.186 
Number of observations: 161  Number of countries: 23  Statistical indicators: 
R-squared: 0.5671   
 
                                                 
10 This method is implemented in the Stata statistical software package by using the xtpcse function.   
11 This method is implemented in the Stata statistical software package by using the regress function with the robust and 
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116.  These results suggest the following: 
(a)  There are conflicting signs about the relationship between the VAT burden and 
the VAT gap.  A one percentage point rise in the theoretical VAT liability divided 
by GDP coincides with an increase in the VAT gap share of 2.725 percentage 
points.  On the other hand, a one percentage point increase in the standard rate of 
VAT seems to coincide with a reduction in the VAT gap share of 0.6 percentage 
points.  
(b)  A lower perception of corruption appears to reduce the VAT gap share.  An 
increase of 1 point in the Corruption Perception Index coincides with a reduction 
in the VAT gap share by approximately 2.4 percentage points. 
(c)  Countries with a larger population have a larger VAT gap share. 
(d)  Countries where construction services account for a greater share of GDP have a 
lower VAT gap share.   
117.  Our finding about the influence of the VAT burden seems inconsistent with Christie 
and Holzner (2006), which found that VAT compliance is greater in countries with 
lower weighted average VAT rates.   
118.  Our finding about the effect of lower perceived corruption is consistent with Christie 
and Holzner (2006), which found that VAT compliance is higher in countries with 
better judicial/legal effectiveness.  Both perceived corruption and judicial/legal 
effectiveness are measures of the effectiveness of the legal system and perceptions of 
corruption, and our model above could be formulated using either variable without 
much change in explanatory power.  A feature in favour of the use of the Corruption 
Perceptions Index is that it is available on a time-series basis whereas the 
judicial/legal effectiveness index is only available for 2004.  Thus, the Corruption 
Perceptions Index might capture changes such as the affect of joining the EU for the 
accession countries whereas the judicial/legal effectiveness index cannot.   
119.  We see a similar effect of country size between the results above, which found that 
larger and richer economies have a greater VAT gap, and Agha and Houghton (1996), 
which found that countries with larger populations have less VAT compliance.   
Robust regression estimates 
120.  Very similar results to the panel corrected standard error model were obtained when 
the “robust” regression procedure was implemented.  The results of the “robust” 
regression are shown in Table 35. Section 3: Econometric analysis of the VAT gap   
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Table 35  Robust regression modelling results 
Dependent variable:  VAT gap divided by the theoretical VAT liability (proportion) 
Explanatory variables:  Coefficient  “Robust” standard error 
Constant 0.446  .067 
Corruption Perceptions Index (0–10, a 
lower score represents a higher 
perception of corruption)  
–0.029 0.003 
GDP per capita (EUR 000 in 1995 
prices) 
0.00009 0.00002 
Theoretical VAT liability divided by 
GDP (proportion) 
2.419 0.705 
EU accession (dummy variable)  –0.05  0.02 
Standard VAT rate  –0.012  0.002 
Gross fixed capital formation of 
construction products divided by GDP 
–0.821 0.22 
Number of observations: 161  Number of countries: 23  Statistical indicators: 
R-squared: 0.7318  Root mean square error: 0.0437 
 
121.  The results in Table 35 above are similar to those in Table 34 reported earlier.     
Instrumental variable regression estimates 
122.  We noted above that even though the Hausman test was passed there may still be a 
possible problem of “endogeneity” which could be attributed to the use of the VAT 
burden as an explanatory variable. 
123.  The relationship between VAT gap share and VAT liability as a proportion of GDP 
reported in Tables 34 and 35 is intuitively and theoretically satisfying: it seems that 
attempts at capturing a greater share of national wealth through VAT lead to more 
VAT evasion and avoidance. 
124.  But the endogeneity issues mean that there is a risk that the magnitude of this effect 
has been overstated.  As well as the underlying relationship between the VAT burden 
and the VAT gap share, the coefficients shown in Tables 34 and 35 might be capturing 
the effect of any errors in the estimation of the theoretical liability. 
125.  This is because any measurement errors in the estimation of the theoretical liability 
would tend to affect both the estimated tax gap and the burden measured by reference 
to the same estimate of VAT theoretical liability, and to affect them systematically in 
the same direction. 
126.  We therefore tested for endogeneity using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test to decide 
whether it is necessary to use an instrumental variable. 
127.  Based on the model presented in Table 35, the VAT burden variable was tested for 
endogeneity using the standard VAT rate and government final consumption divided 
by GDP as instruments for the VAT burden.  The requirement for the instruments is Section 3: Econometric analysis of the VAT gap   
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that they should be correlated with the VAT burden, but they must not be correlated 
with the disturbance term.  The test was failed: estimates from ordinary least squares 
may be biased.  A standard econometric approach to remove the bias arising from this 
endogeneity is to use instrumental variables.  
128.  Under this approach, in order to obtain an unbiased estimate of the effect of the VAT 
burden (the variable to be instrumented), a set of instruments needs to be used as part 
of the estimation.  We used the standard VAT rate and government final consumption 
divided by GDP as instruments for the VAT burden.   
129.  Table 36 shows the results when the model was estimated under this approach.  The 
estimated standard errors are “robust” to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, as in 
Table 35. 
Table 36   Instrumental variable robust regression modelling results 
Dependent variable:  VAT gap divided by theoretical VAT liability (proportion) 
Explanatory variables:  Coefficient  “Robust” standard error 
Constant 0.583  0.151 
Theoretical VAT liability divided by GDP 
(proportion) 
[instrumented by the standard VAT rate and 
government final consumption divided by GDP] 
–1.309 1.388 
Corruption Perceptions Index (0–10, a lower 
score represents a higher perception of 
corruption)  
–0.035 0.005 
Gross fixed capital formation of construction 
products divided by GDP 
–0.987 0.335 
Number of observations: 161  Number of countries: 23  Statistical indicators: 
R-squared: 0.5432  Root mean square error: 
0.056 
 
130.  Table 36 shows that once the VAT burden has been instrumented, its estimated 
coefficient becomes negative: this would now suggest that countries with a higher 
VAT burden have a lower VAT gap share.  In other words, this model indicates that the 
positive correlation found in Tables 34 and 35 may be attributable to the bias arising 
from correlations between the error in estimating the VAT gap and the VAT burden 
estimate. 
131.  The instrumented VAT burden explanatory variable is also no longer statistically 
significant.  We have checked that other combinations of instruments lead to the same 
findings. 
132.  Our conclusion is therefore that there is no reliable statistical evidence of any 
relationship between the VAT burden and the VAT gap. 
133.  Christie and Holzner (2006) found a relationship between the VAT burden measured 
by a weighted average VAT rate and the VAT gap.  This result, like our results in 
Tables 34 and 35, is vulnerable to a risk of bias due to correlations between VAT gap Section 3: Econometric analysis of the VAT gap   
www.reckon.co.uk  57 
and VAT burden arising from possible errors in estimating the theoretical liability or 
weighted average VAT rate.  Christie and Holzner (2006) did not use an instrumental 
variable approach or any other way to address this risk of bias, and does not therefore, 
in our view, provide reliable statistical evidence of any relationship between the VAT 
burden and the VAT gap. 
Models without the VAT burden as an explanatory variable 
134.  In the light of the above analysis, we focus on models that do not include a measure 
of the VAT burden as an explanatory variable.  This means that the general model in 
our general-to-specific modelling approach no longer includes the VAT burden as an 
explanatory variable.  All the other candidate explanatory variables presented earlier 
in this section are included.   
135.  We used a “robust” regression estimation technique for these models as it makes less 
restrictive assumptions about the form of the autocorrelation in the data.   
136.  Table 37 below presents the results of a model without the VAT burden as an 
explanatory variable. 
Table 37   Robust regression without VAT burden, with gross capital formation variable 
Dependent variable:  VAT gap divided by the theoretical VAT liability (proportion) 
Explanatory variables:  Coefficient  “Robust” standard error 
Constant 0.4347  0.0465 
Corruption Perceptions Index (0–10, a 
lower score represents a higher 
perception of corruption)  
–0.032 0.004 
Gross fixed capital formation of 
construction products divided by GDP 
–0.8192 0.277 
Number of observations: 161  Number of countries: 23  Statistical indicators: 
R-squared: 0.6233  Root mean square error: 0.051 
 
137.  The regression reported in Table 37 shows that gross fixed capital formation of 
construction products as a share of GDP was found to be statistically significant 
without the presence of the VAT burden variable.  Countries with 1 percentage point 
more gross fixed capital formation of construction products as a share of GDP are 
estimated to have 0.82 percentage points less of a VAT gap.   
138.  There are three possible interpretations for the apparent relationship between gross 
fixed capital formation of construction products and the VAT gap share: 
(a)  Countries with large construction sectors have smaller VAT gaps suggesting that 
there may be relatively low levels of VAT losses associated with that sector.  
(b)  National accounts could consistently underestimate the value of economic 
activity related to the construction sector.  This might lead to estimates of gross 
fixed capital formation that are biased downwards, causing our estimates of the Section 3: Econometric analysis of the VAT gap   
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VAT liability (and gap) to be lower.  This bias would be correlated with the size 
of the construction sector relative to the economy as a whole. 
(c)  There could be an error in the assumptions we have used to calculate the VAT 
gap related to the construction sector.     
139.  It is not possible to test between these alternative theories.  To address the risk that b) 
and c) above is the case, we have re-run our modelling process excluding the gross 
fixed capital formation variable  
140.  The results of this process show that no variables other than the Corruption Perception 
Index become statistically significant once the gross fixed capital formation variable 
is excluded from the regression.  The coefficients of the other variables are very 
similar to those in Table 36.  
Conclusions from the econometric analysis of the VAT gap 
141.  This section uses an econometric analysis of the VAT gap share, measured by our top-
down analysis, in an attempt at identifying possible causes of differences in the gap 
between countries and over time. 
142.  If the VAT liability as a proportion of GDP is included as a candidate explanatory 
variable, then we find that it has a significant positive relationship with the VAT gap.  
This is in line with the literature on this topic, and with the theory that a higher tax 
burden should lead to higher levels of evasion. 
143.  However, we have identified a risk that this estimated relationship may be biased by 
measurement errors in the estimation of the theoretical liability.  If this risk is taken 
into account by using an instrumental variable regression, then there is no statistically 
significant relationship between the VAT gap share and the VAT liability or the 
standard VAT rate. 
144.  We do not find reliable statistical evidence of a relationship between the VAT burden 
and the VAT gap share. 
145.  The variable found to have the strongest relationship with the VAT gap was the 
Corruption Perceptions Index.  The relationship implies that lower perceived 
corruption is associated with a lower VAT gap share. 
146.  Our analysis has shown that countries where gross capital formation in construction 
as a proportion of GDP is higher, tend to have a lower VAT gap share.  This apparent 
relationship could be due to errors, either in our method or in the coverage of national 
accounts.        
147.  Our general-to-specific approach revealed no statistical signs of a relationship 
between the VAT gap share and many of our other candidate explanatory variables 
that captured the effects of factors that included the standard VAT rate, income 
inequality and poverty, size of the country and tourism. Section 4: An outline of the top-down approach   
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SECTION 4: AN OUTLINE OF THE TOP-DOWN APPROACH 
148.  Our top-down estimate of the VAT gap is based on a comparison of accrued VAT 
receipts with an estimate of the theoretical VAT net liability that would have arisen 
had all VAT due been remitted. 
149.  This section outlines the top-down approach we follow to compute the VAT gap and 
gives an overview of the main data sources used and the main assumptions made.  We 
keep the description set out here brief, and present in other sections a more detailed 
discussion of the data sources used, of the assumptions and adjustments made and of 
possible definitions of the VAT gap. 
An outline of the top-down approach  
150.  We estimate the VAT gap of a Member State in a given year as the difference between 
the net theoretical VAT liability associated with the economic activity in that year and 
the accrued VAT receipts of that Member State in that year.   
151.  The second of these components, accrued VAT revenues, refers to information that is 
readily available from published sources, namely from Eurostat.  Data on VAT 
receipts obtained from Eurostat are prepared according to ESA 95 rules.  These rules 
require Member States to report revenues on an accrual basis, i.e. the VAT on taxable 
transactions occurring during the year should be reported as part of that year’s 
revenues, irrespective of when the VAT was actually paid. 
152.  As such, virtually all of the effort in computing a top-down estimate of the VAT gap 
lies in estimating the net theoretical VAT liability.  Most of this section is concerned 
with this.  
Identifying expenditure contributing to net theoretical VAT liability 
153.  In broad terms, the method we have used to calculate the theoretical net VAT liability 
identifies and measures the categories of expenditure that make a net contribution to 
the total VAT base, for each Member State and year.  The main categories of 
expenditure that make such a contribution are: 
(a)  final consumption expenditure by households, non-profit institutions serving 
households (NPISH) and by government on goods and services;  
(b)  intermediate consumption expenditure that attracts irrecoverable VAT, such as 
expenditure on inputs used in the supply of exempt goods and services; and 
(c)  gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) that attracts irrecoverable VAT, including 
those that can be allocated to the supply of exempt goods and services, and 
purchases of valuables on which VAT cannot be reclaimed. 
154.  We do not include expenditure on intermediate consumption on which VAT can be 
recovered as this expenditure makes no net contribution to the VAT liability. Section 4: An outline of the top-down approach   
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155.  Our main source of data on final and intermediate consumption is the set of use tables 
prepared by each Member State as part of its national accounts and published by 
Eurostat. These tables report the value of expenditure on final consumption by 
households, government and NPISH, intermediate consumption by 59 industry 
groups, total gross capital formation and exports.  Each of these consumption 
categories are further split into 59 product groups that are defined according to the 
Classification of Products by Activity (CPA).  
156.  Use tables are usually published with a time lag of two or more years, and so we do 
not have published data for many Member States for more recent years.  Where use 
tables are not available, we estimate them by combining past trends in the pattern of 
consumption with aggregate consumption data for the recent years.  Section 5 
describes the approach followed in detail. 
157.  The data we use on GFCF is derived primarily from the national accounts domain of 
Eurostat.  This dataset allows us to distinguish between capital formation by each 
institutional sector, and in many cases, by broad industry classifications.  We 
supplement these data with information obtained directly from Member States.  
We estimate the weighted average VAT rates for the defined product categories 
158.  Goods and services differ with respect to the VAT rate that they attract.  This needs to 
be recognised when estimating the theoretical net VAT liability.    
159.  The use tables report expenditure on 59 product groups defined by the CPA and 
accordingly, we need to estimate a single VAT rate for each of these 59 groups of 
products.  In many cases, a group contains products that attract different VAT rates.  
For these mixed product groups, a weighted average rate for the group is estimated 
based on the relative shares of consumption associated with the products within each 
group. 
160.  In computing the weighted average rates, we take into account differences in the VAT 
rates based on who the consumer is.  For example, the relative share of consumption 
that different products within a given CPA group account for will vary depending on 
whether we are considering consumption by households or by businesses.  To 
compute these weighted average rates, we rely on consumption data from household 
budget surveys (HBS) and production data from the Structural Business Statistics 
(SBS) dataset from Eurostat. 
Estimating the share of intermediate consumption on which VAT cannot be reclaimed 
161.  Each of the 59 consuming industries for which data are reported in the use tables can 
recover VAT paid by them on their intermediate consumption to varying extents.  The 
proportion of VAT that can be recovered depends on the nature of their activities, their 
output and their size.  We denote this proportion by propex; the value of propex is 
defined at the industry level.  
162.  Some industries will cover a mixture of exempt and non-exempt activities.  In this 
case, we estimate a weighted average propex for the industry as a whole. Section 4: An outline of the top-down approach   
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163.  National accounts data do not allow us to estimate propex directly.  Instead, we 
estimate propex to be the proportion of the output of a sector that is exempt.  As with 
the exercise of estimating weighted average VAT rates for product categories, we 
estimate the propex for an industry using data from the HBS and SBS for each 
Member State.  This relies on the crucial assumption that mixed industries are 
homogenous in their inputs and outputs, i.e. we assume the share of the value of 
exempt output in total output value is equal to the share of the value of inputs used in 
the production of exempt output in total input value consumed. 
164.  Data on the relevant categories of expenditure, on the corresponding weighted 
average VAT rates and on propex  provide the basis for our estimate of net VAT 
liability resulting from the consumption of each sector. 
We consider a number of further adjustments to the net VAT liability  
165.  To arrive at a final estimate of net theoretical VAT liability we make a series of 
adjustments to the theoretical liability arising from the expenditure categories 
mentioned earlier.  These adjustments take account of special types of activities that 
impact on VAT liability.  Specifically, we seek to adjust for:  
(a)  the restriction on the right to deduct VAT on business entertainment; 
(b)  the restriction on the right to deduct VAT on the purchase of company cars; 
(c)  the exemption granted to small businesses, those whose level of activity is below 
the threshold for VAT registration; and 
(d)  “tank tourism” in Luxembourg, accounting for the consumption of road fuel by 
foreign business users on which VAT is paid in Luxembourg and not recovered 
later. 
166.  Discussion of these adjustments is provided in Section 7. 
The interpretation of the VAT gap 
167.  We obtain our final estimate of total net theoretical VAT liability by aggregating the 
estimated net VAT liability across all expenditure categories and across all products, 
subject to the adjustments described above.  We subtract from this the VAT revenue in 
the relevant year to compute our estimate of the VAT gap. 
168.  In theory, the VAT gap, which is the difference between the theoretical VAT liability, 
— what should have been paid — and accrued VAT receipts — what was actually 
collected — could be caused by VAT fraud.  However, considerable care should be 
taken in interpreting these VAT gap estimates. 
169.  While fraud contributes to the VAT gap, it is not the only determinant of the gap.  The 
gap, as defined by the construction of the top-down approach outlined above is a 
function of many variables, including each of the following items: 
(a)  fraud; Section 4: An outline of the top-down approach   
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(b)  legal avoidance not captured by our approach; 
(c)  unpaid VAT liability due to insolvencies; and 
(d)  the accuracy and completeness of national accounts. 
170.  Legal avoidance of VAT liabilities and unpaid liabilities due to insolvencies both 
contribute to increase the VAT gap.  On the other hand, any failure by national 
accounts to detect and adequately incorporate elements of the shadow economy will 
lower the estimate of the VAT gap. 
171.  The interplay of these factors means that a high VAT gap could be due to the 
prevalence of legal avoidance schemes, while a low gap could indicate a lack of 
completeness in national accounts measuring activity, legal or illegal, in the economy.  
172.  In addition to these complexities, our estimates of the gap are also affected by the 
assumptions we make in the light of data or other constraints.  While some of these 
assumptions have a limited impact only, others have a considerable impact on the 
final results.  For example, we assume that across the EU, 60 per cent of the 
proportion of VAT paid by financial institutions on their inputs is recoverable.   
Modifying this assumption to 25 per cent can have a significant impact on the gap, 
particularly in Member States where the financial sectors make a relatively large 
contribution to output.   
173.  To present the impact on the estimated VAT gap of these assumptions in a systematic 
way, we have tested the sensitivity of our estimates to a set of significant assumptions.   Section 5: Data sources   
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SECTION 5: DATA SOURCES 
Final and intermediate expenditure 
Use tables are the main source of data on expenditure 
174.  For each Member State, the primary source of data on expenditure is a set of use 
tables.  Use tables report “the use of goods and services by product and by type of 
use, i.e. as intermediate consumption (by industry), final consumption, gross capital 
formation or exports.”
12  Use tables are typically prepared by national statistical 
offices and are a key component in preparing national accounts.  In principle, across 
all Member States they are prepared according to the European System of Accounts 
95 (ESA 95).
13  Use tables are available for download from Eurostat.
14 
175.  The data drawn from use tables are at the heart of our approach and so we outline 
with some care what information these contain. 
176.  The use tables published by Eurostat distinguish between 59 separate product 
categories; these are reported by the 2-digit Classification of Products by Activity 
(CPA) codes.  An example of one such product category is “Products of agriculture, 
hunting and related services”, CPA code 01. 
177.  A use table identifies the following types of use that can be made of each of the 59 
different categories of products: 
(a)  intermediate consumption, by industry; 
(b)  final consumption by households; 
(c)  final consumption by non-profit institution serving households; 
(d)  final consumption by government; 
(e)  gross capital formation (this is often split between gross fixed capital formation, 
changes in inventories and changes in valuables); and 
(f)  exports. 
178.  For each of the 59 2-digit CPA product categories, a use table breaks down total 
intermediate consumption into the intermediate consumption by types of industry.  
Industries are classified by 2-digit NACE rev1.1 codes.  There are also 59 such 
categories of industry.  The fact that the number of industry categories is the same as 
the number of product categories is no coincidence: the two classifications are 
purposefully aligned to each other.  Table 51 in the appendix lists the set of 59 2-digit 
                                                 
12  ESA 95 paragraph 9.04, accessed from http://circa.europa.eu/irc/dsis/nfaccount/info/data/ESA 95/en/een00438.htm on 3 
August 2009. 
13  See http://circa.europa.eu/irc/dsis/nfaccount/info/data/esa95/en/esa95en.htm.htm.  Accessed on 3 August 2009. 
14  The table can be downloaded in Excel format from 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/esa95_supply_use_input_tables/data/workbooks , accessed on 3 August 
2009. Section 5: Data sources   
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CPA product categories — and therefore of the 59 2-digit NACE rev 1.1 industries — 
for which the use tables report intermediate and final consumption. 
179.  For the purpose of estimating the theoretical VAT liability, we are not concerned with 
all flows of expenditure recorded in a use table.  In particular, we are only concerned 
with expenditure which gives rise to an irrecoverable VAT liability.  This includes 
final consumption on goods or services subject to VAT as well as intermediate 
consumption and gross capital formation used in the production of exempt products.  
It excludes, on the other hand, intermediate consumption and gross capital formation 
that attract recoverable VAT.  
The values reported in use tables include non-deductible VAT 
180.  In line with the principles set out in ESA 95, the values reported in use tables are at 
purchaser’s price.  That is to say, the value reflects the “price the purchaser actually 
pays for the products; including any taxes less subsidies on the products (but 
excluding deductible taxes like VAT on the products)”.
15 
181.  It follows from this that if we observe in the use tables that household final 
consumption on a product category that attracts a VAT rate of 20 per cent was EUR 
1,200 million, then we will estimate the theoretical VAT liability associated with this 
consumption to be EUR 200 million. 
Coverage of the publicly available use tables 
182.  Use tables are not available from Eurostat for all years in the period 2000-2006 and 
for all Member States as reported in Table 38.  
                                                 
15  ESA 95 paragraph 3.06, accessed from http://circa.europa.eu/irc/dsis/nfaccount/info/data/esa95/en/een00122.htm.  
Accessed on 3 August 2009. Section 5: Data sources   
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Table 38   Eurostat use table availability as of 30 June 2008 
Country  Pre–2000  2000  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
AT  9  9  9  9  9  9    
BE  9  9  9  9  9  9    
C Y            
CZ  9  9  9  9  9  9    
DE  9  9  9  9  9  9    
DK  9  9  9  9  9  9    
EE   9  9  9  9  9    
ES  9  9  9     9    
FI  9  9  9  9  9  9  9   
FR  9  9  9  9  9  9    
GR  9          
HU  9  9  9  9  9  9    
IE  9  9  9  9      
IT  9  9  9  9  9  9    
LT  9  9  9  9  9  9    
LU  9  9  9  9  9  9  9  9 
LV  9          
MT   9  9       
NL  9  9  9  9  9  9    
PL  9  9    9  9     
PT  9  9  9  9  9  9  9   
SE  9  9  9  9  9  9  9   
SI  9  9  9  9  9  9  9   
SK  9  9  9  9  9  9    
UK  9  9  9  9  9     
 
183.  No use tables are available for Cyprus, and because of this, Cyprus has been dropped 
from our analysis.  Greece and Latvia have produced use tables for some years before 
2000 (1995 through to 1999 for Greece, 1996 and 1998 for Latvia) and we have 
drawn on these in our analysis. 
184.  We have sought to fill in the gaps in the coverage.  We have, in short, predicted use 
tables for those Member States for years that are not available from Eurostat.  We 
have done so using the use tables that are available and the published national 
accounts data for more recent years.  There were two steps to this exercise.  First, the 
data from the available use tables were used to define a pattern of consumption — 
how consumption by a given industry was shared across 59 product categories — and 
this pattern of consumption was then extrapolated to years for which use data are not 
available.  Second, the pattern of consumption derived was applied to national 
accounts of the corresponding year to obtain estimates of the value of the relevant 
consumption.   Section 5: Data sources   
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185.  It is worth stressing that our approach to filling in the gaps in the use tables does not 
involve forecasting the absolute values of consumption of any product.  Instead, our 
approach forecasts the pattern of consumption, and applies this to actual total 
expenditure reported in published national accounts.  For example, in Slovakia for 
2006, we do not forecast the value of consumption of food; we forecast the share of 
expenditure on food in total household expenditure from past trends and apply this 
share to actual total household expenditure for 2006 obtained from Eurostat.  
186.  We now set out in more detail the steps involved in our approach. 
Filling in the gaps in the use tables to cover the period 2000-2006 
187.  For each of the use tables that are available for the years since 2000, we computed the 
share that each of the 59 product categories contribute to the total intermediate 
consumption of each industry, and, similarly, to total intermediate consumption of a 
broader set of industries, to total intermediate and final consumption across the whole 
economy and finally to GDP.  We also computed the share that each product category 
contributed to the total final consumption of households, of non-profit institutions 
serving households, of government expenditure and to gross capital formation.   
188.  In short, taking each column in the use table in turn, we computed the shares that a 
given cell in that column contributed to total consumption at various levels of 
aggregation.  
189.  Taking each of these shares separately, we carried out a simple econometric analysis 
to predict the value of these shares in each of the years from 2000 to 2006.  The 
analysis consisted of a standard ordinary least squares regression of the share 
calculated as described above against a variable reflecting time.  The number of data 
points used to run each regression was given by the number of years since 2000 for 
which use tables are available.   
190.  We used the results of the econometric analysis, namely the predicted values of the 
regression, to populate the cells in the use tables for each of the Member States in 
each of the years from 2000 to 2006 that are not held by Eurostat with a value that 
indicates an estimate of the share that each product category contributes towards a 
given class of consumption. 
191.  We combined our estimates of these shares with data from the national accounts 
domain of Eurostat.  The national accounts domain reports aggregate values of 
intermediate consumption by some industry classification, of final consumption split 
by households, NPISH and government, and of gross fixed capital formation.  The 
level of aggregation at which each of these types of consumption is reported varies 
across Member States: 
(a)  For some Member States, intermediate consumption is broken down by NACE 
rev 1.1 classification sub-sections, e.g. it reports the total value of intermediate 
consumption of, say, “DA 15 – Manufacture of food products, beverages and 
tobacco”. Section 5: Data sources   
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(b)  For a few Member States, intermediate consumption is broken down at the level 
of NACE rev 1.1 classification sections, e.g. it reports the total value of 
intermediate consumption of, say, “D – Manufacturing”. 
(c)  Final consumption is broken down by final consumption by households, by 
NPISH and by government, though for some Member States the first two are 
grouped together. 
(d)  Gross capital formation is presented as a single figure, i.e. not broken down at all 
by households, NPISH or government.  We discuss gross capital formation 
further below. 
192.  Depending on the level of aggregation at which data are available for a Member State, 
we applied the forecasted share corresponding to that level of aggregation, giving 
preference to shares computed on the basis of the most disaggregated total. 
193.  To illustrate the mechanics of this procedure we give a worked example below  
194.  Consider the intermediate consumption by the industry defined as “DA15 
Manufacture of food products and beverages” (DA15 for short) of the products 
classified as “01 Products of agriculture, hunting and related services“.  Austrian use 
tables are available for 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004, and a value for the 
consumption of those products by DA15 is reported for each of these years.  The 
purpose of the extrapolation exercise is to estimate what this value would be for 2005 
and 2006.  This exercise involves the steps outlined above, more specifically: 
(a)  Drawing on the Austrian use tables for 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004, we 
compute the share formed by CPA 01 “Products of agriculture, hunting and 
related services“ in each of the years of each of the following:  
(i)  the intermediate consumption of the broader manufacturing sub-section 
DA (which also includes DA16 – Manufacture of tobacco products);  
(ii)  the intermediate consumption by manufacturing section D (covering all 
manufacturing); 
(iii)  all intermediate consumption in the economy; and 
(iv)  gross domestic product of the economy. 
(b)  Taking each of these time series in turn, we ran an OLS regression to obtain 
predicted values of the relevant shares for 2005 and 2006. 
(c)  Data from the Eurostat national accounts domain reveal that data on total 
intermediate consumption by sub-section DA, which combines “DA15 – 
Manufacture of food products and beverages” and “DA16 – Manufacture of 
tobacco products”, for 2005 and 2006 are available.  This is the most 
disaggregate level at which such data are available. Section 5: Data sources   
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(d)  Finally, we multiply the appropriate predicted share described in (b) by the total 
intermediate consumption by DA 15 in 2005 and 2006 to obtain an estimate of 
the intermediate consumption of “01 Products of agriculture, hunting and related 
services“ by DA15. 
195.  For Greece and Latvia, the predicted value of the shares in the years 2000-2006 were 
estimated on the basis of use tables for 1995-1999, and 1997 and 1999 respectively, 
the most recent years for which use tables are available for these Member States.  No 
use tables are available at all for Cyprus and, as such, this Member State was not 
included in our analysis. 
196.  For Ireland and Poland, we have needed to modify our approach slightly.  As shown 
in Table 41, use tables for Ireland are only available for 2000-2002 and in the case of 
Poland, for 2000, 2002 and 2003; data for Poland in 2001 are missing.  A detailed 
visual inspection of the forecasted numbers has uncovered oddities in the data for 
these two countries.  For example in Poland,  household final consumption of CPA 
“95 Products of private households” jumps from PLN 5 million in 2000 to PLN 5,182 
million in 2002.  In Ireland, household consumption of CPA “34 Motor vehicles, 
trailers and semi–trailers” falls from EUR 2,569 million in 2000 to EUR 2,142 in 
2001.  Extending these trends to 2006 would result in obtaining either absurdly high 
or low numbers.  
197.  We have no reason to doubt that the numbers reported in the use tables of these two 
Member States accurately reflect consumption patterns in these countries.  Rather, the 
need to revise our method for these Member States reflects the weakness of our 
forecasting method, namely the assumption that the trend observed over the sample 
period is a good indicator of the trend expected in the remaining years to 2006.   
Consequently, for Ireland and Poland, rather than predict shares based on a trend over 
time, we have computed the average share over the years for which we have data and 
used that share to predict future values of consumption by combining these with 
actual aggregate consumption data from the national accounts to 2006.  For Malta, 
where use tables are available for only two years, we did not compute a time trend; 
instead we used an average of the relevant shares. 
198.  By combining our predicted value of the shares and the data from Eurostat national 
accounts we are able to improve considerably the coverage of our exercise.  However, 
this method of forecasting relies crucially on the relative consumption patterns of 
industry groups following a predictable path based on past trends. We recognise this 
inherent weakness in our estimates for more recent years. 
Gross fixed capital formation 
199.  The use tables report the value of gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) associated 
with each of the 59 2-digit CPA level product categories.  The tables do not report, 
however, how this aggregate GFCF figure is broken down by the industries that are 
carrying out the capital formation.  That is to say, we know what type of capital is 
being formed but not by whom.  For the purposes of estimating the net VAT liability 
base this matters as it is only the GFCF carried out by exempt persons that contributes Section 5: Data sources   
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to the theoretical net VAT liability.  We have turned to other data sources to address 
this. 
(a)  Eurostat’s national accounts domain gives a breakdown of the GFCF by 
institutional sectors: households, non-financial corporations, financial 
corporation, NPISH and government.  These data report who is carrying out the 
capital formation but gives no information on the type of assets associated with it  
These data are annual and coverage is reasonably good for the period 2000-2006, 
though for some Member States and for some years (e.g. Hungary, Malta, 
Luxembourg) a breakdown is not given for all institutional sectors. 
(b)  Eurostat’s national accounts domain also gives a breakdown of the GFCF in a 
given Member State carried out by each of the 31 branches of NACE.  It does 
not, however, identify the types of assets with which the GFCF is associated 
with.  Coverage of this dataset is reasonably good. 
(c)  We have compiled data on GFCF from national sources that are generally 
produced within the context of national accounts.  We have contacted the 
statistics offices of all Member States with requests for GFCF data broken down 
by institutional sector and by type of asset simultaneously.  The availability and 
fineness of the data made available to us vary considerably across Member 
States.  The UK, for example, published a breakdown of GFCF by industry and 
by asset type for each of the years in the period 2000-2004 (though not in more 
recent years) and a further breakdown of GFCF by type of asset and by 
institutional sector.  Most Member States do not make such detailed data 
available.  
200.  The difference in the fineness of GFCF data available from national sources and the 
differences in the VAT legislation across Member States impact on the assumptions 
that are needed to estimate the contribution of GFCF to the theoretical net VAT 
liability.  Section 6 spells these out. 
An outline of the approach to identify net VAT liability associated with GFCF 
201.  We have estimated the net VAT liability associated with GFCF by estimating the 
GFCF carried out by households, non-profit institutions serving households (NPISH), 
financial corporations, general government; and exempt non-financial corporations.  
To estimate the contribution to the theoretical net VAT liability associated with GFCF 
of each of these groups, we: 
(a)  Identify the groups of product for which the estimated weighted average VAT 
was not the standard rate and for which the use tables recorded some positive 
amount of GFCF in the economy. 
(b)  Estimate the GFCF carried out by each of the institutional sectors for each of 
these groups of products. 
(c)  Attribute the difference between a sector’s total GFCF and the GFCF relating to 
products attracting the intermediate or reduced rate to GFCF associated with 
products attracting the standard VAT rate. Section 5: Data sources   
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VAT rates 
202.  To estimate the theoretical net VAT liability, it is necessary to match each of the 
expenditure numbers to the corresponding VAT rate.  As we draw on use tables for 
data on expenditure, and because the data on expenditure are reported at the level of 
2-digit CPA product categories, it is necessary to estimate a weighted average VAT 
rate to be applied to the consumption of each of the 2-digit CPA products.   
203.  In many cases, the 2-digit CPA code is broader than the level at which VAT rates are 
defined.  For example, the group “15 Food products and beverages” consist of 
processed food items, alcoholic beverages and non-alcoholic beverages. The 
applicable VAT rates applicable are frequently different for food and for alcoholic 
beverages.  Because of this, it is necessary to estimate a weighted average VAT rate to 
set against this category of products.  We do so by: 
(a)  Identifying the VAT rate applicable on the consumption of goods and services 
defined at the lower, narrower, 4-digit CPA level. 
(b)  Applying appropriate weights to these rates to estimate a weighted VAT rate at 
the broader 2–digit CPA level.  
204.  Taking the products of the 2-digit CPA food and beverages sector as an example, 
Table 39 illustrates the added “fineness” obtained by carrying out the first step of the 
exercise at the 4-digit CPA level. Section 5: Data sources   
www.reckon.co.uk  71 
Table 39    Breakdown of “CPA 15 – Manufacture of food and beverages”. 
15.11  Fresh and preserved meat, except poultry 
15.12  Fresh and preserved poultry meat 
15.13  Meat and poultry meat products 
15.2  Processed and preserved fish and fish products 
15.31  Processed and preserved potatoes 
15.32  Fruit and vegetable juices 
15.33  Processed and preserved fruit and vegetables n.e.c. 
15.41  Crude oils and fats 
15.42  Refined oils and fats 
15.43  Margarine and similar edible fats 
15.51 Dairy  products 
15.52  Ice cream and other edible ice 
15.61 Grain  mill  products 
15.62  Starches and starch products 
15.71  Prepared animal feeds for farm animals 
15.72  Prepared pet food 
15.81  Bread, fresh pastry goods and cakes 
15.82  Rusks and biscuits; preserved pastry goods and cakes 
15.83 Sugar 
15.84  Cocoa; chocolate and sugar confectionery 
15.85  Macaroni, noodles, couscous and similar farinaceous products 
15.86  Coffee and tea 
15.87  Condiments and seasonings 
15.88  Homogenized food preparations and dietetic food 
15.89  Other food products n.e.c. 
15.91  Distilled alcoholic beverages 
15.92 Ethyl  alcohol 
15.93 Wines 
15.94  Cider and other fruit wines 
15.95  Other non–distilled fermented beverages 
15.96  Beer made from malt 
15.97 Malt 
15.98  Mineral waters and soft drinks 
 
205.  In assigning a VAT rate for each of the 4-digit CPA products, we have distinguished 
between the VAT that would be applicable if the product were to be consumed by 
households, by the healthcare sector, by the education sector, by other government 
activities and if it were to be consumed by any other party.  These distinctions will 
matter in cases where legislation envisages that the applicable VAT rate depends on 
who is doing the consumption.  The distinction also matters in those cases where we 
believe that there are important differences between the groups listed above in relation Section 5: Data sources   
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to how their consumption of products within a given 4-digit CPA category is 
distributed and that these different products attract different VAT rates. 
206.  We assigned a VAT rate for each of the 4-digit CPA products, in each Member State 
and for each year from 2000-2006 on the basis of information collected primarily 
from: 
(a)  the “Value added taxation in Europe” publication of the International Bureau of 
Fiscal Documentation; 
(b)  national VAT legislation; and 
(c)  various editions of the Commission document “VAT rates applied in the Member 
States of the European Community” published over the period 2000-2007. 
207.  While it is more straightforward to assign a single VAT rate to a set of products 
defined at the 4-digit CPA products rather than at the broader 2-digit level, an element 
of judgment remains.  For example, in the UK, chocolate covered biscuits are 
standard rated, in contrast to food products in general which are reduced rated.  The 4-
digit CPA code does not allow us to uniquely identify chocolate covered biscuits, only 
that they are probably part of “15.84 Cocoa, chocolate and sugar confectionary”.  In 
most cases, we have not found a source of information that would allow us to 
construct weights at a level below the 4-digit CPA level.  Where this is the case, we 
make an assumption based on our view of the likely contribution that a particular 
product makes to the overall consumption of the 4-digit CPA sector. 
208.  To estimate the weighted VAT rate at the 2-digit CPA level, the VAT rates at the 4-
digit CPA level are weighted according to the contribution of the products to the 
higher 2-digit CPA level.  In most instances, we have constructed these weights on the 
basis of data from the more recent Household Budget Surveys of each Member State, 
where available, and have otherwise used data from Structural Business Statistics 
reported by Eurostat. 
VAT receipts 
209.  The data outlined above all contribute to the estimation of the theoretical net VAT 
liability.  To compute an estimation of the VAT gap, it is necessary to compare the 
estimate of that liability with the levels of VAT receipts that were actually accrued in 
the relevant year. 
210.  We have obtained data on these VAT receipts from Eurostat.  According to paragraphs 
1.57 and 4.26 of ESA 95, tax receipts are to be reported on an accruals basis, although 
they are collected on a cash basis.  Council Regulation 2516/2000 details the rules to 
be followed on the timing of recording and the amounts to be recorded according to 
the accrual method. 
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(a)  A time-adjusted cash method, where cash received is attributed to the period 
when the activity took place; this is generally based on the typical time 
difference between when the activity took place and when the cash is received. 
(b)  A method based on declarations and assessments and adjusted for amounts that 
are declared or assessed but unlikely to be collected. 
212.  We were informed by Eurostat that the data on accrued VAT receipts prepared by most 
Member States are based on the time-adjusted cash method.  The reporting of the VAT 
receipts on an accruals basis fits in with the purpose we have at hand: we wish to 
compare the net VAT liability arising from the economic transactions taking place in a 
given year — as estimated on the basis of the use tables and other sources — with the 
VAT receipts accrued in that same year. 
213.  Eurostat data on accrued receipts are reported net of input VAT refunds to VAT-
registered bodies eligible to recover their input VAT.  However, this does not apply to 
refunds that operate outside the scope of the VAT system.  For example, in the UK, 
local authorities can claim a refund of VAT incurred on the purchase by them of 
contracted-out services.  This refund operates outside the scope of the VAT system 
and, as such, we have assumed that Eurostat data on VAT receipts are reported gross 
of these refunds.       Section 6: Assumptions   
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SECTION 6: ASSUMPTIONS 
214.  This section reviews the assumptions that our top-down analysis draws on.  We focus 
on the set of assumptions that, in general, are common to the analysis carried out for 
each Member State. 
215.  Assumptions are needed to bridge the gap between the intricacies of the VAT system 
and the fineness of available national accounts data.  The top-down approach attempts 
to identify all those supplies of products which give rise to a net VAT liability in a 
given year in a particular Member State.  The approach cannot hope to arrive at a 
precise measurement of this liability.  The impossibility of doing so stems from the 
fact that data are not available to us, and indeed do not exist at all, that would allow 
all intricacies of the VAT systems to be picked up.   
216.  An exercise of judgement is necessary to identify to what level of detail one should 
carry out the analysis in order to ensure that those aspects of the VAT legislation that 
are likely to have a material impact on VAT liability are adequately captured.  We 
have had to make a number of simplifying assumptions.  We have aimed to strike the 
right balance between the need to be as accurate as possible, the availability of data 
and the time constraints of the study.  
Completeness of national accounts  
217.  We assume national accounts are complete in the sense that they capture all economic 
activity, including the shadow economy.  ESA 95 requires this to be the case but they 
do not spell out the method statistics offices should follow.  Our assumption is that the 
method that is followed be each statistics office, whatever it might be, is one that 
adequately captures the shadow economy. 
Proportion of intermediate consumption on which VAT is not recoverable 
218.  We set out below the assumptions we make to determine the proportion of 
intermediate consumption on which VAT is not recoverable.  We denote this 
parameter as propex.  We first set out the assumption made in relation to estimating 
propex for industries in general, and then set out the assumptions that we make for the 
purpose of determining propex  for some particular cases, namely for financial 
intermediation, for the education sector and for rental activities. 
The general case  
219.  One component of our top-down method is the estimation of the proportion of the 
intermediate consumption by various industries that attracts irrecoverable VAT.  With 
a few exceptions such as company cars and entertainment which we will deal with 
separately, this corresponds to the proportion of intermediate consumption used in the 
production of exempt goods and services.  This concept is best explained by an 
example.    
220.  Consider the consumption, in Austria in 2003, by the 2-digit NACE sector “I.64 - Post 
and telecommunications” (I.64) of the products belonging to “CPA 22 Printed matter 
and recording media” which was approximately EUR138 million. Section 6: Assumptions   
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221.  In Austria, as in other Member States, the activities relating to national post are 
exempt whilst activities relating to telecommunications are not.  The activities of the 
national post are classified under the NACE code I.64.11.  This sector, in turn, is a 
part of I.64.  Clearly, some proportion of the consumption of “CPA 22 Printed matter 
and recording media” by the I.64 sector relates to the production of national post 
activities.  It is this proportion of consumption by the I.64 industry that contributes to 
the VAT base, and which, therefore, we have to estimate.  
222.  We have attempted to estimate the value of propex for each of the consuming 
industries of the use table.  In some cases, like household final consumption, propex 
will be equal to 1 as the entire consumption of this sector makes a contribution to the 
net VAT base.  In other cases, such as when considering I.64 as a consuming sector, 
this number needs to be estimated.  We estimate this number by setting it equal to the 
proportion of the value of output on national post out of the value of total output of 
the aggregate I.64 2-digit sector.  
223.  There is an implicit assumption behind this method: in particular, it is assumed that 
the share of output within a 2-digit NACE sector reflects the share of inputs used to 
produce that set of goods.   
224.  We use this method to compute propex for all exempt activities, with the exception of 
the financial services sector, the education sector and the rental sector.  Our approach 
to devising a value for the propex parameter for these three sectors is described 
separately below. 
225.  We should also note that for sectors other than that classified in NACE as “J. 
Financial intermediation”, discussed below, we assume that the intermediate 
consumption recorded in the use tables relates to transactions outside VAT groups.  
We think this is a reasonable assumption for those sectors whose intermediate 
consumption contributes to the net theoretical VAT liability. 
Financial intermediation  
226.  In general, most activities that fall within the NACE group “J. Financial 
intermediation” are exempt in all Member States.  However, a few Member States 
allow some financial services firms to “opt to tax”, thereby waiving their exempt 
status and reclaiming some of their input VAT. 
227.  A further source of complexity relates to the treatment of “VAT groups”, a matter 
which, for the purpose of this study, impacts on firms in the financial sector in 
particular.  The issue raised by VAT groupings relates to the practice of allowing 
separate entities to be treated, for VAT purposes, as a single entity thereby not 
charging VAT on transactions between them.  The use tables do not allow us to 
estimate the precise numbers that relate to “within VAT group” as opposed to “outside 
VAT group” transactions.   
228.  We have not found alternative sources to estimate propex as the actual proportion of 
irrecoverable VAT paid by financial service firms tends to be confidential and is not 
usually published. Section 6: Assumptions   
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229.  This lack of information, coupled with the relatively large sums of VAT revenue 
involved, means we have needed to make an important assumption.  A report 
published by the European Commission provides the results of a survey carried out of 
financial services firms across the EU.
16  This survey reports a range of 0 to 74 per 
cent for the proportion of VAT that is actually recovered.  We have settled on an 
assumption across the EU that 40 per cent of VAT is recovered.  We have tested the 
sensitivity of the overall VAT gap to this assumption; the results are presented in 
Section 2.  
Education sector 
230.  In general, the activities of the sectors classified in NACE as “M.80 Education”, are 
exempt across the EU as far as they relate to primary, secondary and university 
education.  However, services such as the provision of professional training and of 
driving lessons are generally subject to VAT and these too are part of the category 
“M.80 Education”.  We think that the supply of these education services that are 
subject to VAT account for a significant share of the output of the wider “M.80 
Education”.  In the light of this, it is necessary to form an estimate of the propex 
associated with the “M.80 Education” sector.  
231.  We have not come across published data that would allow us to compute the value of 
the “propex” for “M.80 Education” directly.  We do, however, have data on the final 
consumption of education services by the government and by NPISH, and we also 
have data on the intermediate consumption by other industries of education services.  
By making the rough assumption that all government and NPISH consumption of 
education services relate to exempt education and that all intermediate consumption 
by other industries and direct consumption by households relate to “market” 
education services that are subject to VAT, we have arrived at an EU-wide assumption 
that 20 per cent of the input VAT of “M.80 Education” is recoverable.  We have tested 
the sensitivity of the overall VAT gap to this assumption; the results are presented in 
Section 2.  
Rental activities and the option to tax 
232.  Letting and leasing activities of immovable property is generally exempt with an 
option to tax, if the lessor chooses.  Where that is the case, we have assumed that the 
lessor would choose to remain exempt when the lessee or tenant is an exempt entity, 
for example households.  Likewise, we assume that the lessor would opt to tax where 
the lessee or tenant is a business that can recover its input VAT.  
233.  We have computed the proportion of intermediate inputs of the rental sector that gives 
rise to irrecoverable VAT to be equal to the share of the final consumption by 
households, government and NPISH and intermediate consumption by financial 
services, education and healthcare in the total output of the rental sector.  We have 
                                                 
16 Report prepared on behalf of DG TAXUD, available from 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/common/publications/studies/Financial_Services_Study_Main
Report_en.pdf , accessed on 3 August 2009. Section 6: Assumptions   
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deducted imputed rents from both the numerator and denominator.  Data on imputed 
rents are available from Eurostat. 
Interpreting the data on final consumption 
234.  We turn to a discussion of assumptions made in the use of data on final consumption 
expenditure by households, NPISH and government.  These assumptions are re-
statements of some of the guidelines of ESA 95 and, as such, these assumptions are 
subsumed within the earlier assumption that national accounts are prepared in 
accordance with ESA 95.  All the same, we choose to set them out here explicitly. 
Purchases on the domestic territory by non-residents and by national residents abroad 
235.  In line with ESA 95 guidelines, we assume that the data reported in the use tables 
under “Final consumption by households” include the value of purchases made in the 
domestic territory, by both residents and non-residents, and exclude purchases made 
by residents abroad.  As an example, it is assumed that expenditure by French tourists 
staying in a hotel in Malta is included in the Maltese use tables under “Final 
consumption by households” on the product category “H55 Hotels and restaurant 
services”.  
Purchase of goods by mail-order  
236.  We assume that mail-order goods sold to final consumers based in the EU by a 
supplier based in another EU Member State are recorded as household consumption 
in the Member State where the supplier is based. 
237.  On the other hand, our estimation assumes that if the mail-order goods are purchased 
from a supplier that is outside the EU then that purchase is reflected in the household 
consumption of the Member State where the consumer is located.   
Purchase of e-services 
238.  We assume that purchases of e-services by consumers based in the EU are recorded as 
household final consumption in the use tables of the Member State in which the e-
service provider is registered for VAT purposes.  For example, the purchases of e-
services by a Danish resident from a provider registered for VAT in Luxembourg are 
assumed to be included in the value of household final expenditure reported in the 
Luxembourg use tables and not in the Danish ones. 
239.  If a supplier of e-services is in a country outside the EU and is not registered for VAT 
in any Member State, we assume that the VAT it remits to a single tax authority under 
the simplified scheme, is allocated appropriately to each Member State and that the 
associated consumption values are recorded by those Member States in their use 
tables.  
Final consumption by households on alcohol and tobacco is accurately reported 
240.  The data on household final consumption reported in use tables are based, in part, on 
household budget surveys.  It is known that in such surveys, consumption of goods Section 6: Assumptions   
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such as alcohol and tobacco tends to be significantly under-reported, and that 
adjustments are made to this as a correction.   
241.  We assume that the data reported in the use tables for household final consumption of 
products relating to “D15 Food products and beverages”, which include alcoholic 
drinks, and to “D16 Tobacco products” reflect the consumption of these products 
accurately so that any corrections for under-reporting and smuggling will have been 
made.  This is in keeping with the ESA 95 guidelines.   
242.  Consistent with our definition of tax losses, we assume that the VAT lost on the 
consumption of illicit alcohol or tobacco, is the VAT that would have been paid, had 
the same amount of money been spent on legal excise duty-paid tobacco or alcohol. 
Gross capital formation 
243.  ESA 95 defines gross capital formation (GCF) as gross fixed capital formation 
(GFCF) plus changes in inventories plus net acquisitions of valuables.  GFCF is by far 
the more significant component of GCF.  In this subsection we turn to a review of 
assumptions relating to the contribution of each of these components to the net 
theoretical VAT liability.  
We do not consider changes in inventories 
244.  The purchase of products underlying any recorded change in inventory would, if 
carried out by a party unable to reclaim VAT, make a contribution towards the net 
VAT liability.  However, in our analysis we have not considered this contribution.  
This choice is grounded on the following reasoning: 
(a)  We have not found published data that allow us to break down changes in 
inventory by both type of asset and by type of consuming industry.  The use 
tables published by Eurostat report a single economy-wide number for the 
change in inventory associated with a given product category; information on 
whose inventory it is that is changing is not provided and, consequently, we are 
unable to isolate the changes in inventory carried out by parties that cannot 
reclaim VAT. 
(b)  Our judgement is that stocks are by far more likely to be held by businesses that 
are not exempt rather than by exempt ones.  That is to say, we expect inventories, 
and changes in inventories, held by public administration, health and education 
institutions and financial corporations to account for a very small share of the 
changes in inventories in the economy as a whole. 
(c)  Typically, changes in inventories of a given product category account for a small 
share of the total intermediate consumption across the economy of that product 
category and, accordingly we think the impact on the estimated net theoretical 
VAT liability to be small. 
245.  The direction of the (relatively small) error in our estimate caused by not taking 
account of the changes in inventories carried out by exempt sectors will depend on 
whether the observed change in inventory is positive or negative.  If, in a given year Section 6: Assumptions   
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the change in the inventories held by an exempt sector of a given product category is 
positive then, by not taking account of changes in inventories, we will be 
underestimating the theoretical VAT liability.  Conversely, we would be over-
estimating the liability when the observed change in inventory is negative.  Because 
changes in inventories fluctuate between being positive and negative with no clear 
trend, and because these magnitudes are relatively small, we do not expect that our 
approach induces us in any consistently significant under- or over-estimation of the 
net theoretical VAT liability. 
We consider changes in valuables 
246.  As noted above, changes in valuables (ESA 95 code P.53) are one of the components 
of GCF.  Valuables are defined at paragraph 3.125 of the ESA 95 manual as “non-
financial goods that are not used primarily for production or consumption, do not 
deteriorate (physically) over time under normal conditions and that are acquired and 
held primarily as stores of value.”  Valuables include precious stones and metals, 
precious jewellery, pearls, antiques and art objects such as paintings and sculptures.  
We note that agent or dealer margins associated with the acquisition and disposal of 
valuables will contribute to the value recorded against changes in valuables. 
247.  The data in the use tables reported by Eurostat, and in published national accounts 
more generally, break down the changes in valuable by type of assets but not by the 
type of industry that is acquiring and disposing of these valuables.  All the same, we 
do take account of the changes in valuables for the purpose of estimating the 
theoretical net VAT liability as we think that it is reasonable to assume that the VAT 
paid on these acquisitions of valuables cannot be reclaimed. 
248.  In estimating the contribution to the theoretical net VAT liability we have set against 
the reported value of changes in values the standard VAT rate relevant to the Member 
State and year under consideration. 
249.  Finally, we note that some Member States do not report changes in valuables 
separately and, instead, include this within the figures for GFCF. 
A general assumption on the data on GFCF 
250.  The figures for GFCF reported in national accounts represent net flows.  That is to 
say, they represent the difference between acquisitions and disposals of fixed capital 
goods.  This raises a difficulty in identifying the value of transactions that may give 
rise to a VAT liability.  
251.  To see this, consider the case where the institutional sector defined as “government” 
sells EUR 1 million worth of existing office buildings to “non-financial corporations”, 
and invests in EUR 11 million worth of new buildings.  In the sector accounts 
reported in national accounts, in relation to office buildings, the government account 
would report a GFCF of EUR 10 million, and the account of the “non-financial 
corporations” would report EUR 1 million.  The acquisition of existing buildings by 
businesses would not attract VAT, as they would be second-hand goods.  However, we 
have computed the VAT liability on the GFCF of EUR 10 million in buildings — the 
data recorded in national accounts — rather than on the EUR 11 million.  Section 6: Assumptions   
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252.  On the other hand, we would not be able to distinguish between the purchase by the 
government of an existing building previously owned by a “non-financial 
corporations” and the acquisition by the government of a new building.  Both 
expenditures would have the same impact on the government’s GFCF account. 
253.  We would have problems of a similar nature when dealing with Member States where 
a significant number of residential dwellings have been transferred from the 
Government to private non-financial corporations. 
254.  To correct this it would be necessary to access GFCF data that report acquisitions and 
disposals of capital separately and that identify the sectors between which capital is 
acquired from or disposed to.  We have not found such data in published national 
accounts.  We have therefore been unable to estimate the impact on our calculation of 
the net theoretical VAT liability of considering net GFCF rather than separating out 
the acquisition and disposal of capital of each of the institutional sectors.  In this 
respect, we think our VAT liability estimate related to GFCF might be lower than it 
should be.   
Set of assumptions on the contribution to VAT liability from GFCF that are common 
across Member States  
255.  The differences in the nature of the data on GFCF available across Member States, as 
well as the differences across national VAT legislation, do not allow us to follow the 
exact same procedure across Member States when estimating the contribution of 
GFCF to net theoretical VAT liability.  But there are a number of assumptions that we 
do make which are common across all or most of the Member States.  We set these 
out below.  
1: GFCF associated with agricultural, forestry and fishing products are assumed not to 
attract VAT 
256.  Across all Member States the use tables report some positive value for the GFCF 
associated with products of agriculture, forestry and fishing (corresponding to the 2-
digit CPA product categories codes “A.1 Products of agriculture, hunting and related 
services”, “A.2 Products of forestry, logging and related services” and “B.5 Fish and 
other fishing products; services incidental of fishing” respectively).  We assume that 
the GFCF associated with these products do not reflect the supply of products on 
which VAT would be applied. 
257.  The assumption is based on our view that the GFCF associated with these products is 
likely to reflect the increase in the value of existing cultivated assets (orchards, forest 
trees, herds of cattle, flocks of sheep, shoals of fish used in fish farming) rather than 
the creation of new forms of capital that will have been acquired from other sectors.  
ESA 95 specifies that GFCF should incorporate changes in the value of such 
cultivated assets.  Admittedly, positive values of the GFCF associated with these 
product categories could also come about through the importation of these types of 
fixed capital.  Our assumption is that GFCF through the development of existing 
domestic capital of this sort is likely to account for a far greater proportion of total 
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258.  In turn, the increase in the value of an existing orchard, herd of animals or shoal of 
fish used for production do not reflect any economic supply and so would not attract 
any VAT and therefore does not contribute to net VAT liability. 
2: GFCF associated with medical equipment 
259.  Medical equipment attracts a reduced or intermediary VAT rate in many, though not 
all Member States, and some of the GFCF recorded against the product category 
“DL33 Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks” relate 
precisely to such medical equipment.  Further, we expect that a significant fraction of 
the GFCF associated with medical equipment is carried out by parties, namely 
providers of health services, that are VAT exempt.  Because of this, it is necessary to 
estimate the portion of GFCF associated with the purchase of these types of assets.  
260.  The use tables available from Eurostat do not allow us to do this directly; medical 
equipment is part of the wider 2-digit CPA product category “DL33 Medical, 
precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks” and it is the total GFCF on this 
set of products that is reported.  However, more detailed national accounts for the UK 
and for France provide us with information on: 
(a)  For the UK for 2000-2004, the GFCF associated with the purchase of assets in 
the product category DL33 by the industry categorised as “hospitals and health 
care”. 
(b)  For France for 2000 and 2001, the GFCF associated with the purchase of assets 
classified as “Fabrication de materiel medico_chirurgic” by “Le secteur des 
Administrations publiques” (APU). 
261.  We think it is reasonable to assume that the data described above for the UK and 
France relate to the purchase of medical equipment and instruments by hospitals and 
health care providers.  For the remaining Member States, for which we have been 
unable to find similarly detailed data, we estimate the value of the GFCF on medical 
equipment by hospitals and health care providers as follows: 
(a)  Using the data available for France and the UK, we compute the ratio of the 
GFCF on medical instruments by hospitals and health care providers to the value 
added by the health and social work sector (NACE code N) as reported in the 
Eurostat use tables.  We then compute an average of this ratio across these two 
Member States for the years for which data are available. 
(b)  For each of the other Member States and for each of the years in the period 2000-
2006, we estimate the value of GFCF associated with the purchase of medical 
equipments by hospitals and health care providers by multiplying the average 
ratio described above by the value added of the health and social work sector as 
reported in the relevant use table. 
262.  The approach outlined assumes that ratio between GFCF on medical equipment by 
hospitals and health care providers and the value added associated with health and 
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3: GFCF associated with dwellings and other buildings 
263.  GFCF associated with dwellings is a substantial component of the GFCF on which 
VAT sticks.  The VAT legislation on transactions that relate to GFCF in dwellings 
tends to be particularly complex in many Member States.  For example, a different 
rate applies to the renovation of dwellings in Belgium depending on the age of the 
dwelling, and in Italy the VAT rate on the purchase of new dwellings depends on 
whether it is a first or second home, luxury or not.   
264.  Lack of relevant data does not allow us to examine these and all other intricacies of 
the relevant VAT law.  We attempt, however, to distinguish between, on the one hand 
investments in new dwellings, and on the other, expenditure on major improvements 
to existing dwellings.  Both of these expenditures contribute to GFCF associated with 
dwellings and, in some Member States, these two types of supply attract different 
VAT rates. 
265.  We have contacted the national statistics offices of those Member States for which the 
split between the two types of GFCF on dwellings is relevant to our analysis with 
requests for data that would allow us to compute the relevant ratio.  Some Member 
States were able to provide us with these data.  
266.  For those Member States for which relevant data are not available to us, we assume 
that of the total GFCF in dwellings, half relates to investment in new buildings and 
half to major improvements in existing buildings.  This assumption is broadly based 
on figures for this share for the UK — where the split was estimated to be 42 per cent 
on new dwellings and 58 per cent on major improvements — and for France where 
the split over the period 1990-2000 is close to 50 per cent for each component. 
267.  We make this assumption in the estimate of the net theoretical VAT liability of those 
Member States where, on our interpretation, the VAT rate applicable on investment in 
new dwellings differs from that applicable to major improvements to existing 
dwellings and for which we do not have national data that might have provided a 
more precise estimate of the split.   
268.  In most Member States the supply of existing buildings — buildings that are not 
newly built — does not attract VAT, but in some (e.g. Italy) it does.  We have not 
taken this contribution to VAT liability into account in our analysis as we do not have 
the data to identify the value of such transfers.  We note that the supply of non new 
buildings do not contribute to gross fixed capital formation figures in national 
accounts, other than through the transfer costs that they originate (such costs we have 
taken into account). 
269.  Given the significance of GFCF on dwellings, we examine the sensitivity of our 
estimate of the overall VAT gap to the assumptions on how GFCF on dwellings is split 
between the two categories considered.  The results are presented in Section 2. Section 6: Assumptions   
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4: We have sought to take account of other taxes on transfer of real property 
270.  Taxes on the transfer of real property (stamp duty) are considered to contribute 
towards GFCF.  Such taxes do not attract VAT, and it is necessary, therefore, to 
exclude these amounts from the GFCF figure before applying the relevant VAT rate.   
271.  We are not able to identify the relevant tax head for some Member States, namely 
Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia and Malta.  We are also aware that 
stamp duty may also apply to the transfer of goods other than the transfer of real 
property; where that is so, and where data relating to stamp duty on real property 
alone is not separately identified, we may have deducted an excessive amount.   
272.  For the purpose of our analysis, it is necessary to apportion the receipts relating to 
taxes on transfer of real property across the relevant consuming sectors/industries.  
This is usually done on the basis of the GFCF associated with new dwellings and 
other buildings carried out by each sector/industry (where such information was 
available) or on the basis of each sector/industry’s GFCF on construction more 
generally. Section 7: Adjustments   
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SECTION 7: ADJUSTMENTS 
273.  In this section we describe a number of adjustments we use for the purpose of 
capturing particular aspects of the VAT system which impact on estimates of the 
theoretical net VAT liability.  These adjustments relate to business entertainment 
expenditure, company cars, “tank tourism” in Luxembourg and exemption granted to 
small business. 
274.  We also identify in this section a small number of features for which we make no 
adjustment.   
Business entertainment expenditure 
275.  In general, across the EU, the VAT on expenditure incurred by businesses on 
entertainment is subject to restrictions on the right of deduction, even if the business 
is not engaged in an exempt activity.  We have not come across any data sources that 
allow us to estimate this expenditure.   
276.  These restrictions may make a significant contribution theoretical VAT liability.  To 
account approximately for them we assume that the VAT on all intermediate 
consumption of the product category “H.55 Hotels and restaurant services” is 
irrecoverable.  We exclude from this, self-supplies to the industry “H.55 Hotels and 
restaurants”, to the sector “I.63 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities 
of travel agencies” and consumption by exempt sectors which we account for 
elsewhere. 
Company cars 
277.  In general, across the EU, some restrictions apply to the right to deduction on VAT 
incurred on the purchase of company cars.  The scope and extent of these restrictions 
vary considerably across Member States.  The restrictions depend not only on who is 
making the purchase but also on the nature of use.  
278.  We have not been able to find published data sources on the precise proportion of 
VAT incurred on such expenditure that is recoverable in any Member State.  In the 
absence of this data, we are compelled to make a very rough assumption.  We assume 
that, across the EU, an amount equivalent to 50 per cent of the total gross fixed capital 
formation (acquisitions less disposals) in the economy on products of the sector 
“DM34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers” is subject to the restriction on the 
right to deduct input VAT. 
279.  We test the sensitivity of the overall gap estimates to this assumption and the results 
are presented in Section 2. 
 “Tank tourism” 
280.  “Tank tourism” refers to the practice of foreign haulage and transport businesses 
filling up their trucks in a Member State to take advantage of less expensive fuel 
there. Section 7: Adjustments   
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281.  “Tank tourism” is a significant activity in Luxembourg.  A significant share of petrol 
and diesel sold in Luxembourg is accounted for by the consumption of foreign 
vehicles.  It is estimated that in 2006, around 80 per cent of diesel and 70 per cent of 
gasoline sold in Luxembourg was in fact “exported.
17  Other than possible logistical 
reasons, the low price of fuel in Luxembourg relative to those in neighbouring 
countries will have been an important factor behind this.  From 2000 to 2006 prices at 
the pump for automotive diesel were, on average, around 30 per cent higher in 
Germany than in Luxembourg, in the Netherlands and France they were around 25 per 
cent higher and in Belgium 16 per cent.
18 
282.  Technically, the consumption of fuel in Luxembourg by private cars from other 
Member States should count as household consumption and should be presented as 
part of household consumption in Luxembourg.  We assume that this is indeed the 
case and that there is therefore no need for a special adjustment in this regard. 
283.  Consumption of fuel by business vehicles from other Member States, on the other 
hand, count as exports from Luxembourg, and should be treated as such by the 
Luxembourg use tables.  Such consumption attracts VAT in Luxembourg.  In theory, 
businesses registered in other Member States can apply for a refund of the VAT paid 
in Luxembourg.  We have no information on what portion of this VAT goes 
unclaimed.  We assume that all exports of the products related to “DF23 Manufacture 
of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel” are subject to Luxembourg VAT 
that is not refunded.  This assumption potentially overstates the VAT liability arising 
from “tank tourism” in Luxembourg.  We do not make this adjustment for any other 
Member State.   
284.  We test the sensitivity of our assumption on the VAT gap for Luxembourg and we 
present the results in Section 2. 
Exemption granted to small businesses 
285.  The VAT Directive allows Member States to exempt taxable persons whose annual 
turnover is below some threshold.  The value of these thresholds, as of May 2008, is 
set out in Table 40.  
                                                 
17  Ministère de l’Environnement, Luxembourg (2008) “Luxembourg’s National Inventory Report 1990-2006 – Submission 
under the United Nations Convention on Climate Change and voluntary submission under the Kyoto Protocol”, Table 
3.44.  Available from 
http://unfccc.int/national_reports/annex_i_ghg_inventories/national_inventories_submissions/items/4303.php, accessed on 
3 August 2009. 
18  The average relative prices are calculated as the average, across the 14 six-monthly observations covering the period 2000 
to 2006, of the relevant price ratio.  Price data relate to prices including all taxes.  The data were obtained from Eurostat’s 
“Energy Statistics” domain. Section 7: Adjustments   
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Table 40   Thresholds for application of special scheme for small businesses, May 2008 
Member State  Threshold    Member State  Threshold 
AT €  30,000   IT  None 
BE €  5,580    LT  €28,962 
CZ €37,622    LU  €10,000 
DE €17,500    LV  €14,347 
DK  €6,705    MT  €37,000, €24,300, or €14,600 
EE €15,978    NL  None 
ES None    PL €13,883 
FI  €8,500    PT  €9,976 or €12,470 
FR €76,300  or  €27,000    SE  None 
GR  €9,000 or €4,000    SI  €25,000 
HU €19,700    SK  €44,642 
IE €70,000  or  €35,000    UK  €87,098 
Source:.http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/vat/traders/vat_community/vat_in_EC_annexI. 
pdf, accessed on 15 May 2008. 
286.  Taxable persons with a turnover falling below the applicable threshold are exempt 
from VAT.  It follows that: 
(a)  The sale of the goods or services produced by these taxable persons does not 
attract VAT. 
(b)  These taxable persons are not able to recover the input VAT that they will have 
paid. 
287.  To take account of the small business exemption on our estimation of the theoretical 
VAT liability it is necessary to deduct an element equal to product of the value added 
by those taxable persons falling below the small business threshold times and the 
relevant VAT rate. 
288.  We have not found data reporting the value added of business by level of turnover.  To 
overcome this we have contacted all relevant Member States to ask for data on the 
VAT foregone due to the exemption to small business.  Table 41 reports the 2006 
values for those that responded.   
Table 41   Estimated VAT revenue foregone due to small business exemption 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
UK (GBP million)  100 400 400 450 300 900 950 
Ireland  (EUR  million)  42.61 25.27  40.3  37.3 59.83 41.96 37.56 
Estonia  (EEK  million)  154.9 175.5 196.9 220.8 243.3 453.4 358.7 
Hungary (HUF million)  n.a.  2,047  n.a  2,659 10,607 14,752  8,667 
Malta  (EUR  million)  5.87 6.68 7.14 7.40 9.53 9.58  10.03 
Source: UK HM Treasury”Chapter A: Budget Measures, of the "Financial Statement and Budget Report", several years; and 
data received from Irish Revenue and the Ministries of Finance of Estonia, Hungary and Malta. Section 7: Adjustments   
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289.  For Ireland, Estonia, Malta and Hungary the values reported in Table 7 do not relate 
to all of the VAT foregone due to the exemption granted to small businesses.  Rather, 
the values are those that were submitted as part of the relevant VAT own resource 
calculations.  As such, the values relate to the VAT foregone due to the exemption 
granted to business with a turnover below the threshold stipulated by national 
legislation — set out for 2006 in Table 44 — and above €10,000.  As such, the values 
used for these Member States will be an underestimate of the VAT receipts that are 
foregone due to the exemption granted to small businesses.  Because the values in 
question are relatively small, we do not consider this to have a material impact on our 
overall estimate of the VAT gap. 
290.  For those Member States for which we were not able to collect relevant data, we 
estimate the foregone VAT by applying a percentage to our estimated theoretical net 
VAT liability.  The percentages applied are informed by the data that we did receive 
from some of the Member States and by the relative size of the thresholds.  For 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Luxembourg, Poland and Portugal we assume 
the foregone VAT to be 0.1 per cent of liability, for Austria, Germany, Latvia and 
Slovenia we apply 0.3 per cent, and for the Czech Republic, France, Lithuania and 
Slovakia a percentage of 0.5 per cent.  
Supplies in domestic territories with different VAT regimes 
291.  The VAT regimes applicable to the supply of goods and services in specific territories 
of some Member States differ from those applicable in the rest of the national 
territory.  This is the case, for example, of the Portuguese archipelagos of the Azores 
and Madeira where the applicable VAT rates are lower than those in mainland 
Portugal.  Some national territories are outside the scope of the VAT directive 
altogether and no EU VAT applies.  This is the case, for example, of the Canary 
Islands (Spain) and of French Guiana (France). 
292.  We have adjusted our estimate of the theoretical net VAT liability of the relevant 
Member States to take account of the special regimes that apply in Madeira and 
Azores (Portugal), Corsica and in the Overseas Departments (France) and in Lesbos, 
Chio, Samos, Dodecanese and the Cyclades and on the Aegean Islands of Thassos, 
Northern Sporades, Samothrace and Skiros (Greece).  We have also adjusted our 
estimate of the VAT liability of Spain to take account of the fact that VAT does not 
apply in the Canary Islands.  We have made no other territorial adjustment. 
293.  In all cases the adjustment to the estimated liability was estimated on the basis of the 
VAT rate differentials and on the region’s share of national GDP.  Implicit in this 
computation is the assumption that the economy of each of these territories is a 
“scaled down” version of the economy of the relevant Member State as whole.  In the 
adjustment done for the Canary Islands it was further necessary to deduct from the 
VAT receipts figures the revenues associated with the Impuesto General Indirecto 
Canario (IGIC) as this is included within the VAT receipts reported by Eurostat.  Data Section 7: Adjustments   
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on the IGIC receipts were obtained from the “National List of Taxes” publication 
made available by DG TAXUD.
19 
Adjustments that have not been carried out 
294.  We do not make adjustments to reflect the special schemes provided to farmers and 
others, purchases on the domestic territory by non-residents or mail order purchases 
from suppliers based outside the EU.  We set out below the reasoning for our 
approach. 
Special schemes provided to farmers and others 
295.  Across a number of Member States special schemes are in place for specific sectors of 
the economy.  The special flat rate scheme for farmers is perhaps the most common 
example and is provided for where the application to farmers of the “normal VAT 
arrangements or the special scheme [for small enterprises] is likely to give rise to 
difficulties.”
20 
296.  A farmer under the flat rate scheme does not make a claim for the VAT he will have 
paid on his inputs.  Instead, the farmer is compensated by a percentage that is applied 
to his sales of agricultural goods and services.  The percentage is fixed by each 
Member State operating such a scheme and the VAT Directive specifies, in Article 
298, that the percentage is to be “calculated on the basis of macro-economic statistics 
for flat-rate farmers alone for the preceding three years” and, in Article 299, that it 
“may not have the effect of obtaining for flat-rate farmers refunds greater than the 
input VAT charged.”  In addition, the directive also specifies, in Article 296 that 
“every flat rate farmer may opt […] for application of the normal VAT arrangements”.  
297.  On the basis of the above, we think it is reasonable to assume that the percentages that 
are fixed for flat-rate farmers are such as to render the scheme neutral in fiscal terms.  
That is to say, we think it is reasonable to assume that the compensation percentages 
are estimated such that flat-rate farmers are compensated for the VAT input that they 
will have paid.  Given this, flat-rate farmers, like all other non-exempt intermediary 
sectors in the economy, make no net contribution to the theoretical VAT liability and it 
is not necessary, therefore, to examine their activity with any greater attention. 
Purchases in the domestic territory by non-EU residents 
298.  We make no adjustment for the purchases made in the domestic territory by non-EU 
residents on which VAT has been reclaimed.  Again, we believe that what would be 
gained in terms of the accuracy of our estimates would be too small compared to the 
significant efforts required to source the data necessary to make these adjustments. 
                                                 
19  Accessed from 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/gen_info/economic_analysis/tax_structures/2009/2009
_NTL_en.xls on 3 August 2009. 
20  Article 296 Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax.  Available 
from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2006/l_347/l_34720061211en00010118.pdf , accessed on 3 August 
2009.  Section 7: Adjustments   
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Mail-order purchases from suppliers based outside the EU 
299.  We make no adjustments for special arrangements that might apply to low-value 
consignments supplied from locations outside the EU.  For example, the UK operates 
a low-value consignment relief scheme whereby inbound packages valued below a 
threshold set by HMRC are exempt from VAT upon importation.  We do not have 
access to data that would allow us to make an adjustment for such schemes.   Section 8: Definitions of the VAT gap   
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SECTION 8: DEFINITIONS OF THE VAT GAP  
300.  This section considers possible definitions of the VAT gap and sets out the reasoning 
for the definition adopted by this study.  
Possible definitions of the VAT gap 
301.  We have identified two issues that have a material bearing on the definition of the 
concept of the VAT gap: 
(a)  In cases where tax evasion leads to an increase in consumption or economic 
activity (albeit illegal activity), should the amount of tax that ought to have been 
levied on the additional activity be included in the tax gap (even though that 
activity only occurs because tax is not collected)? 
(b)  When VAT has been evaded on a transaction, should the actual expenditure that 
is observed be deemed to be inclusive of VAT or exclusive of VAT? 
302.  We do not think it possible to construct a sufficiently robust estimate of tax losses that 
answers the first question in the affirmative.  The change in the behaviour of traders 
and consumers more generally that results from there being tax evasion is not 
observed.  To estimate such a change requires knowledge about the responses of 
suppliers and consumers, e.g. the elasticity of demand.  There are also further 
consequential effects of compliance, such as consumers substituting between 
products, which will further affect the tax that is collected.  Our assessment is that 
estimating these effects across the whole economy is too vulnerable to missing or 
inaccurate information about the consequences of compliance making such an 
exercise unreliable and impractical.   
303.  This leaves only the second identified issue remaining, and leads to three possible 
definitions of tax losses: 
(a)  The “tax not remitted” definition measures the tax that would not have been 
remitted had all fraud taken the form of traders not submitting their VAT returns 
and payments.  This definition assumes that the fraudulent transaction amount is 
inclusive of VAT.  Thus, observing a black market transaction worth 120 on 
which 20 per cent VAT should have been charged will be deemed to correspond 
to a loss of 20, the VAT element of the 120 paid by the consumer. 
(b)  The “tax not collected” definition measures the tax that would not have been 
collected had all fraud taken the form of VAT not being charged on transactions 
where it should be.  This definition assumes that the fraudulent transaction 
amount is exclusive of VAT.   Thus, observing a black market transaction worth 
120 on which 20 per cent VAT should have been charged will be deemed to 
correspond to a loss of 24 — because the consumer should have paid 144, of 
which 24 would have been VAT. 
(c)  The “full recovery” definition measures the amount that would be recovered 
through enforcement action by the VAT collection agency if it had perfect 
information about past frauds, and if there were no losses due to insolvencies.   Section 8: Definitions of the VAT gap   
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304.  This full recovery definition requires transaction specific information about the type 
of fraud that has been committed in each case.  The tax not remitted and tax not 
collected definitions do not require this transaction specific information.  Instead, 
these definitions only need data on consumption, on the relevant VAT rate and on 
actual VAT receipts in order to estimate the VAT gap.   
Worked examples of the differences between the definitions for the VAT 
gap 
305.  We now describe how the three candidate definitions would be applied in four stylised 
examples each reflecting different types of tax losses.  This will, we think, clarify the 
above definitions and clarify the reasoning for our adopted definition.  We will see 
that the estimate of the amount of tax lost may depend on the definition adopted. 
Worked example 1: VAT evasion with complicity of the final customer  
306.  The first worked example involves the following fraud scenario: 
A trader undertakes some work for a consumer.  The work is, in law, liable for 
VAT at 20 per cent.  At the instigation of the consumer, the trader does not 
account for VAT and charges 120 on a cash-in-hand basis. 
307.  Under the tax not remitted definition, it is assumed that the transaction (120) includes 
VAT.  Under this definition the VAT associated with this transaction that ought to have 
been remitted is 20.  In contrast, under the tax not collected definition which assumes 
the fraudulent transaction is exclusive of VAT, the amount of VAT deemed not to have 
been collected is 24.  
308.  Assuming full recovery by the tax authorities, the consumer would have been made to 
pay 24 of VAT to the authorities, unless there was no evidence that he initiated the 
fraud.  If no such evidence were available, the proceeds of enforcement (excluding 
penalties) would only be 20 as a result of compulsory registration/assessment of the 
trader’s liability.  This illustrates how exact knowledge of the fraud is required to 
assess the VAT loss under the full recovery definition.   
Worked example 2: VAT evasion by a trader, without complicity of the final customer 
309.  The second worked example involves the following fraud scenario: 
A wholesaler purchases goods worth 120 including 20 of VAT, and sells them on 
to retailers for 240 including a stated VAT amount of 40.  The wholesaler submits 
a fraudulent VAT return which does not include these transactions and does not 
pay any VAT associated with the goods.  Retailers sell the goods on for 300, 
including VAT of 50, and remit VAT of 10 to the tax authorities in the ordinary 
way. 
310.  In this example, the net VAT receipts in respect of these goods are 30. Section 8: Definitions of the VAT gap   
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311.  Under the tax not remitted definition, the level of VAT that ought to have been 
remitted is estimated to be 50.  Compared to the actual level of VAT receipts of 30, 
this would imply that the level of VAT not remitted was 20. 
312.  Under the tax not collected definition it would be estimated that, given the observed 
VAT receipts of 30, final consumption should have been 180.  However, given that 
observed final consumption was actually 300, this would mean that there would have 
been 120 of fraudulent consumption which should have attracted additional VAT of 
24.  Under this definition, therefore, VAT receipts should have been 54 (24+30).  This 
gives estimated VAT losses of 24. 
313.  Under the full recovery definition, the level of VAT that ought to have been remitted 
is estimated to be 50.  Compared to the actual level of VAT receipts, this would imply 
that the level of VAT not remitted was 20. 
Worked example 3: MTIC fraud 
314.  The third worked example involves the following fraud scenario: 
A trader “A” acquires goods worth 120 from a legitimate trader registered for 
VAT in another Member State.  The legitimate trader charges no VAT on the 
transaction.  The acquirer then sells the goods, possibly via intermediaries, to 
another trader “B”, issuing a VAT invoice for 120 plus VAT of 24 (assuming the 
VAT rate is 20 per cent).  Trader “A” goes missing without settling any VAT.  
Trader “B” supplies the same goods to a trader based in another Member State 
for 150 plus zero VAT.  Trader “B” then applies for a refund of his input VAT of 
24 supposedly paid to trader “A”.   This input tax claim is valid under the 
European Court of Justice ruling in Optigen 
(http://www.reckon.co.uk/item/e225e8e4).  There is zero final consumption of the 
goods in this example. 
315.  The VAT effects of the fraud are as follows: 
(a)  The intra-community acquirer, trader “A”, pays no VAT and receives no VAT 
refund. 
(b)  The intra-community supplier, trader “B”, receives a VAT refund of 24, this 
being the VAT on the 120 that it paid on the goods to trader “A”. 
316.  Under the tax not remitted definition, net VAT receipts that ought to have been 
remitted are zero, and therefore the estimated tax losses are 24.  The same estimates 
are produced under the “full recovery” definition.  
317.  Under the definition of tax not collected a different measure of tax loss is computed to 
be 28.8, the calculations underlying this figure are set out in Table 42.  Identifying the 
level of deemed fraudulent consumption is not as straightforward as the previous 
examples.  In this MTIC example, as was the case in worked example 2, the measure 
of tax loss associated with the tax not collected definition is one that we cannot 
reconcile with any interpretable measure.  Section 8: Definitions of the VAT gap   
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Worked example 4: Fraudulent consumer import 
318.  The fourth worked example involves the following fraud scenario: 
An individual acquires 120 worth of goods from another Member State, allegedly 
for business purposes and, accordingly, he provides his business’ VAT number.  It 
is classified as an intra-community acquisition and does not attract the 20 per 
cent VAT that would otherwise be paid.  The goods are in fact put to personal 
rather than business use and no VAT is declared.  
319.  Under the tax not remitted definition, it is estimated that there should have been a 
VAT payment of 20 associated with the observed final consumption of 120.  In the 
context of this worked example, this measure of tax loss cannot easily be interpreted 
as the type of fraud does not fit with the specified definition.  
320.  Under the tax not collected definition, the tax loss in respect of the fraudulent 
transaction would be calculated to be 24.  This corresponds to the VAT that the 
consumer should have been charged had he not fraudulently claimed to be importing 
the goods for business purposes. 
321.  Using the full recovery definition, the estimated tax loss would also be 24. 
Tax losses calculations in the worked examples 
322.  Table 42 overleaf shows the different tax gap definitions for the worked examples. Section 8: Definitions of the VAT gap   
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Table 42   Calculation of different definitions of the VAT gap in worked examples 
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323.  The worked examples described above and summarized in Table 42 illustrate the 
limits of the appropriateness of each of the possible definition of the VAT gap 
considered: 
(a)  Measure D, “tax not remitted”, yields estimates that are not meaningful in the 
case of fraud where goods are imported allegedly for business use but are 
actually put to personal use (worked example 4).  In the case of VAT evasion 
where the consumer is complicit (worked example 1), measure D gives an 
indication of the tax loss that the tax authority would be able to recover from the 
trader without having to prove the complicity of the consumer himself.  This may 
understate the amount recoverable by the tax authorities. 
(b)  Measure G “tax not collected” yields estimates that are not meaningful and that 
cannot be interpreted in the case of VAT evasion by a trader (worked example 2) 
and in the MTIC case (worked example 3).   Section 8: Definitions of the VAT gap   
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(c)  Measure H “full recovery” cannot be estimated on the basis of macroeconomic 
data alone.  They require transaction-specific information or assumptions. 
324.  We think that measure G “tax not collected” is not appropriate.  The case against this 
measure is the erroneous results that it gives in worked examples 2 and 3. 
Choice of definition for the study 
325.  In this study we choose to focus on “tax not remitted” estimates based on macro-
economic data. 
326.  The “tax not remitted” definition provides a simple and clearly-defined measure, with 
the following features when used to analyse different types of fraud: 
(a)  It provides the natural measure of the value of fraud in cases of MTIC and 
wholesale evasion, and a reasonable measure in the case of retail evasion. 
(b)  It provides the correct measure of the value of fraud in cases of consumer fraud 
provided the data on final consumption incorporate adjustments made to reflect 
tax evasion where consumers are complicit (in the spirit of worked example 1).  
(c)  It does not provide a correct measure of the value of fraud in cases of consumer 
fraudulently importing goods for non-business purposes.  
327.  The “tax not remitted” definition appears to be the one used in estimates of the VAT 
gap by some national tax collection agencies.  However, it is not universally adopted 
by researchers in the area of tax fraud.  For example, the calculations carried out in 
Christie and Holzner (2006) imply a definition of tax losses in line with the “tax not 
collected” definition set out above.
21 
                                                 
21  Christie, E and Mario Holzner (2006) “What explains tax evasion?  An empirical assessment based on European data”, 
wiiw Working Papers 40, available from http://www.wiiw.ac.at/pdf/wp40.pdf , accessed on 3 August 2009. Section 9: Review of published estimates of VAT fraud and the VAT gap   
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SECTION 9: REVIEW OF PUBLISHED ESTIMATES OF VAT 
FRAUD AND THE VAT GAP 
328.  This section provides a brief review of estimates of VAT fraud and VAT losses (or 
VAT gap) published by national tax authorities, other government agencies or 
departments, and research institutes.  It reviews, in turn, top-down estimates, and 
bottom-up estimates which, by constructing an estimate of overall VAT fraud on the 
basis of the VAT fraud associated with different types of fraudulent activity, offer a 
characterisation of VAT fraud as a whole. 
329.  We have complemented our own search of relevant publications by contacting 
stakeholders in all Member States inviting them to point us to published studies that 
estimate VAT fraud.  
330.  This section is structured as follows.  First, we present the results of published top-
down estimates of the VAT gap for some Member States.  Second, we review two 
bottom-up studies, one by the UK’s HM Revenue and Customs and another by the 
Swedish Skatteverket, which provide estimates of the contribution of different types 
of fraudulent activities to total VAT fraud.  Third, and closing this section, we review 
some published estimates of MTIC fraud, one of the components of VAT fraud that 
has attracted most attention in recent years. 
Published top-down estimates of the VAT gap 
331.  We have found published estimates of the VAT gap for some of the years overlapping 
with our period of analysis for Denmark, Germany, Italy, Sweden and the UK.  These 
have been prepared by Danmarks Statistik, the Ifo Institut for Economic Research in 
Munich, the Italian Agenzia delle Entrate, the Swedish NCB/NR and by HMRC 
respectively.  The estimates of the VAT gap produced by these institutions are reported 
in Table 43, alongside our own  For the period between 2000 and 2006, we have not 
come across published top-down estimates for other Member States. Section 9: Review of published estimates of VAT fraud and the VAT gap   
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Table 43   Other published estimates of the VAT gap 





Units Year Liability Receipts Gap  Liability  Receipts  Gap 
2000  155.6  141.6 14.0  158.6  140.0 18.5 
2001  156.5  138.5 18.0  160.4  139.1 21.4 
2002  156.5  138.5 18.0  157.7  136.8 20.9 
2003  156.5  138.5 18.0  158.4  137.2 21.2 
2004  154.2  135.7 18.5  159.4  137.4 21.9 









2006  157.9  142.9 15.0  164.1  147.1 17.0 
DK 2000  132.2  123.8  8.4  135.6  123.8  11.9 
 
DKK 
billion  2001 136.6  128.5  8.0  140.9  128.5  12.4 




 2003  144.3  135.1  9.2  145.2  135.1  10.1 
2000  106.4  73.5 33.0  99.9  77.5 22.4 






2002  111.8  76.7 35.1  106.1  80.4 25.7 
2000 198.7  194.9  3.8  208.0  194.9  13.2 
2001 208.7  204.6  4.1  217.0  204.6  12.4 
SE NCB/NR  SEK 
billion 
2002  217.3  215.7 1.6  225.2 215.7 9.5 
2000  n.c.  n.c. 10.0  76.5  64.2 12.3 
2001 n.c.  n.c.  11.3  80.4  67.1  13.3 
2002  n.c.  n.c. 12.2  85.3  71.1 14.3 
2003 n.c.  n.c.  9.9  90.3  77.3  12.9 
2004  n.c.  n.c. 10.3  95.6  81.6 14.0 







2006  n.c.  n.c. 12.8  106.1  87.8 18.4 
Note: We believe receipts and liability figures of HMRC are not comparable (n.c.) principally because these are 
net of re-payments to eligible public bodies.  HMRC estimates for the UK are computed on the financial rather 
than calendar year.  The figures given in the table for the estimate by HMRC for the UK for, say, 2000 relate to the 
estimate for 2000/2001.  The figures from Danmarks Statistik are gross of deduction for debtors. 
Sources: Nam and Parsche (2007) “Trotz 19% Mehrwertsteuer wird für 2007 ein weiteres, Absinken der Ausfallquote 
erwartet”, ifo Schnelldienst 10/200, pp41-42; Danmarks Statistik (2007) “Danish National Accounts: Sources and 
Methods 2003”Table 3.71; Agenzia delle Entrate (2006) “Le basi imponibili IVA Aspetti generali e principali risultati 
per il periodo 1982-2002”; Swedish National Tax Agency (2008) "Tax Gap Map for Sweden: How was it created and 
how can it be used?", Report 2008:1B Table 6; HMRC (2007, 2005) “Measuring indirect tax losses”. 
Our estimates will differ from those published by national tax agencies and other 
institutions 
332.  We understand the estimates of the various institutions reported in the table above 
have been arrived at on the basis of a top-down approach, broadly similar to that 
which we ourselves have followed.  We are aware, all the same, of some differences 
between the approaches which will account for some of the differences between the 
set of estimates. Section 9: Review of published estimates of VAT fraud and the VAT gap   
www.reckon.co.uk  98 
333.  First, there will be differences in the set of national accounts data we used and that 
used by each of the above institutions, in terms of their coverage and detail.  Where 
data were not available to us in sufficient detail, we have made assumptions, some of 
which have a material impact on our estimates of the VAT liability.  We have 
described the set of assumptions in Sections 2 and 6, and report in Section 2 on the 
sensitivity of our results to the most significant of these.  Further, national accounts 
are often subject to revisions by the national statistics agency and it is possible that 
the “edition” of the data we drew on is not the same as that which underlies the 
estimates of the institutions listed above. 
334.  Second, other than for Denmark, our data series on VAT receipts are also different 
from those used by each of the other institutions in their estimations of the VAT gap.  
With the exception of the UK, we do not have an explanation for these differences.  
We received written comments from the UK HMRC in June 2009 suggesting that the 
VAT receipts for the UK reported by Eurostat (and reported in the published UK 
national accounts) are net of some refunds to National Health Service Trusts; we do 
not have a published source of information that would allow us to adjust our estimates 
to reflect this. 
335.  The above differences come about from differences in the data used or in the way 
estimates are reported, and do not reflect differences in the general approach 
followed.  In terms of differences in approach, we are aware of just the following 
three points. 
336.  For Germany, we understand that an adjustment is made to the receipts figure to 
reflect VAT that has not been remitted due to insolvencies.  Our own estimate of the 
VAT gap has not sought to exclude the effect of VAT not remitted due to insolvencies.  
For Denmark, Danmarks Statistik publishes estimates of the theoretical liability both 
with and without adjusting for deductions for debtors.  To make the comparison with 
our estimate on an equal footing, we report the estimate where such deductions have 
not been adjusted for.  For the UK, HMRC does not include VAT losses associated 
with smuggled alcohol and tobacco in its estimate of the VAT liability.  To the extent 
that these illegal activities are captured by national accounts, these losses are included 
in our estimates of the VAT liability and VAT gap. 
337.  As reported in Table 43, our estimates of the German VAT gap are consistently higher 
than those reported by Ifo although the differences are relatively small.  The trend in 
our estimates of the VAT gap mirrors that of the estimates produced by Ifo.   
338.  Similarly, our estimates of the VAT gap for Denmark are consistently higher than 
those published by Danmarks Statistik.  Unlike Germany, however, the trend in our 
estimated VAT gap does not mirror the trend in the estimates produced by Danmarks 
Statistik.   
339.  Our estimates of the VAT gap for the UK are also higher than those published by 
HMRC.  For the reasons outlined above we are not able to compare the reported data 
on VAT receipts and estimated liability.     
340.  In contrast, Table 43 reveals that our estimates of the VAT gap for Italy are 
consistently lower than the one published by the Agenzia delle Entrate.  One factor Section 9: Review of published estimates of VAT fraud and the VAT gap   
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contributing to this is the fact that the series of VAT receipts used by the Agenzia delle 
Entrate differs from the one we obtained from Eurostat and used.  We cannot 
reconcile the difference in the receipts data; whilst they may have been compiled 
differently they are both meant to reflect a notion of accrued receipts.  
341.  Lastly, our estimates of the Swedish VAT gap are considerably higher than those 
produced by NCB/NR.  We have not found a published description of the top-down 
approach used by NCB/NR to explore this further.  We do note, however, that these 
very low estimates of the VAT gap by NCB/NR have been commented on by 
Skatteverket as appearing to be unreasonably low.
22 
Bottom-up quantification of the components of VAT fraud 
342.  We have not carried out a bottom-up estimate of the VAT gap ourselves as we have 
not found a satisfactory way of estimating the relative contribution of different types 
of VAT fraud on the basis of publicly available data.  Producing a bottom-up estimate 
of the level of VAT fraud starts from identifying the different types of fraud and then 
proceeds to estimate the size of each of these components.  Invariably, this requires 
operational data that are typically only held by national tax authorities and are 
confidential.   
343.  We focus, instead, on reviewing published bottom-up studies of VAT fraud.  Ahead of 
presenting this review we make two observations.  First, we have found only two 
studies that attempt to estimate the overall level of VAT fraud by identifying the size 
of different categories of fraud; one was completed by the UK’s HMRC in 2002 and 
the second by the Swedish Skatteverket in 2008.  Second, other studies of relevance 
that we are aware of focus on estimating the value of a particular form of VAT fraud, 
MTIC which has attracted the most attention in recent years. 
Bottom-up estimates of VAT losses in the UK and in Sweden 
344.  We have found only two published studies that have sought to construct a bottom-up 
estimate of VAT losses.  The HM Customs & Excise (HMCE) in the UK published a 
note of their estimate on this in 2002 and, more recently, the Skatteverket have 
published a very detailed report outlining the results of their bottom-up estimates.  We 
review each in turn. 
HMCE (2002) estimates of VAT losses in the UK 
345.  The note prepared in 2002 by the UK’s HM Customs & Excise, later HM Revenue & 
Customs (HMRC), on “Measuring indirect tax losses” (HMCE, 2002) presented 
estimates of VAT losses associated with (i) missing trader (inter-community) fraud 
(MTIC), (ii) avoidance and (iii) general non-compliance.
23  The first two are self-
explanatory and the third, general non-compliance, is described as “the failure of 
                                                 
22  Skatteverket (2008) “Tax gap map for Sweden — How was it created and how can it be used?”, Report 2008:1B, p31.  
Available from  http://www.skatteverket.se/download/18.225c96e811ae46c823f800014872/Report_2008_1B.pdf, 
accessed on 3 August 2009. 
23  HM Customs & Excise (2002) “Measuring indirect tax losses”.  Available from http://www.hm-
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businesses to pay the right amount of VAT at the right time” and is defined at 
paragraph 2.37 of the note to include “errors and omissions on tax returns, including 
failure to submit returns, late payment, non-payment or incomplete payment and 
deliberate mis-declaration of input or output tax on tax returns”. 
346.  HMCE drew on different approaches to estimate each of the three types of losses.  
Estimates of losses due to MTIC fraud were prepared on the basis of trade data.  The 
exercise centred on comparing the data on exports to the UK declared in other 
Member States with the imports from other Member States declared in the UK.
24  
Further details of the approach is described in the section on MTIC fraud below.  
Estimates of the losses due to general non-compliance are based on operational data.  
Finally, losses due to avoidance were estimated by drawing on: 
(a)  An estimate of how much businesses spend on VAT avoidance schemes (between 
£250 and £300 million a year); 
(b)  An assumption that this spending refers to the fees paid to accountancy firms 
managing tax avoidance fees; and  
(c)  An assumption that accountancy firms’ fees for such services are 10 per cent of 
the tax saved. 
347.  The estimates put forward by HMCE against each of these types of VAT losses are set 
out in Table 44.  This table also reports the estimate for overall VAT fraud HMCE 
arrived at through its top-down approach, as reported in its 2002 publication 
“Measuring indirect tax losses”. 
Table 44   HMCE bottom-up and top-down estimates of VAT losses 
  Period covered  Lower estimate  Upper estimate 
Bottom-up estimate       
Missing trader fraud  2001/2002  £1.75 billion  £2.75 billion 
Avoidance  Annual — no specific year  £2.5 billion  £3 billion 
General non-compliance  Annual — no specific year   £2.9 billion  £4.5 billion 
Total    £7 billion  £10 billion 
Top-down estimate  2001/2002 £10.4 billion 
Note: The top-down estimate of £10.4 billion, reported in HMCE’s 2002 publication, has been revised in subsequent 
“Measuring indirect tax losses” publications. 
Source: HMCE (2002) “Measuring indirect tax losses” 
348.  Commenting on the figures presented in Table 44, HMCE (2002) notes that the 
bottom-up figures provide “a useful corroboration” for the top-down estimate.   
According to the bottom-up estimates, VAT losses are roughly between £7 billion and 
£10 billion.  These are in the same neighbourhood as the £10.4 billion top-down 
estimate. 
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349.  Given the uncertainty surrounding its estimates, HMCE (2002) adds that a great deal 
of caution is necessary when interpreting the figures, particularly so for the estimates 
of the losses  due to general non-compliance and from avoidance.   
350.  HMCE/HMRC, did not publish estimates of the fraud associated with general non-
compliance (or with avoidance) in later years as it reasoned that it was “difficult to 
construct estimates of their relative contribution to overall revenue loss” (HMRC, 
2005, page 6).
25 
Skatteverket (2008) estimates of the VAT gap in Sweden 
351.  Skatteverket published in 2008 its study “Tax gap map for Sweden — How was it 
created and how can it be used?” which outlines the approach and results of its 
research into the tax losses in Sweden.
26  The study adopts a different definition from 
the taxes not remitted definition we have adopted.  In particular, Skatteverket (2008) 
define the tax gap in the executive summary to the report: 
as the difference between the tax that would have been determined if all those 
liable for tax reported all their business and their transactions correctly and the 
tax that actually is determined after the efforts of the National Tax Agency to 
ensure compliance. 
352.  The notion of tax losses used reflects in part, therefore, the knowledge of the tax 
authority and does not consider whether taxes have actually been paid or not.   
353.  The study reports on losses across various types of tax, including VAT.  For each tax, 
the study estimates the losses associated with three broad categories of activity: 
international, undeclared employment and other national.  With respect to VAT, the 
activities found to contribute to the “international” component of the tax loss refer to 
ones involving import/export, trade with other EU Member States, carousel trade and 
trading of cars and boats.  The “undeclared employment” component of the VAT gap 
relates primarily to the VAT losses arising from the non reporting of sales by 
companies and, to a less extent, to undeclared services and good provided to private 
individuals.  Finally, the activities contributing to the “national” component of VAT 
losses relate to errors in VAT reporting, including on the tax position of company cars. 
354.  Skatteverket (2008) draws on a number of different sources to derive the above 
estimates.  With regards to the VAT gap associated with international transactions, the 
estimates are based on calculations by Swedish customs and we understand that the 
estimates on the tax gap associated with undeclared employment are based on a 
number of sources including survey results and national accounts data, the latter being 
used, we understand, to develop a top-down estimate of the gap.  The sources of data 
used to estimate the “Other national” element of the VAT gap include inspection 
projects and outcomes of audit work by Skatteverket itself. 
                                                 
25  HM Revenue & Customs (2005) “Measuring indirect tax losses”.  Available from 
www.hmrc.gov.uk/pbr2005/mitl2005.pdf accessed on 3 August 2009. 
26  Skatteverket (2008) Tax gap map for Sweden, Report 2008:1B.  Available from 
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355.  Skatteverket (2008) estimates the total VAT tax gap to be SEK 35.3 billion.  As 
reported in Table 45, VAT losses associated with transactions associated with 
undeclared employment account for almost half of the total VAT gap, and within this, 
it is the VAT gap relating to unreported sales in companies that is the most significant.  
Table 45  Swedish VAT tax gap reported in Skatteverket (2008) 
Nature of fraud  Tax gap, SEK billion 
International transactions  11.8 
    Import/export  3.6 
    EC trade  3.0 
    Carousel trade  1.0 
    Trade with cars, boats etc  1.1 
    Other  3.2 
Undeclared employment  17.1 
    Unreported sales in companies  13.6 
    Undeclared services between private individuals  1.3 
    Black market goods to private individuals  0.8 
    Other  1.5 
Other national  6.4 
    Micro-companies  2.1 
    Small and medium-sized companies  2.0 
    Large companies  0.9 
    Public sector associations etc  3.8 
Total  35.3 
Source: Skatteverket (2008, p. 62)  
356.  Skatteverket (2008) comments that its estimates of the international component of the 
VAT gap is subject to significant uncertainty and notes that it has been in relation to 
the VAT gap, more generally, that it has found it hardest to find reliable data for 
estimation and that “the general opinion of those working on VAT controls is that the 
gap is great, but in most cases it has been hard to back up that impression with 
facts”.
27 
Published estimates of MTIC fraud 
357.  Missing trader intra community (MTIC) fraud is a criminal activity that takes 
advantage of the zero-rating of cross-border intra-EU trade to evade VAT or to 
fraudulently claim input VAT refunds.  
358.  There are broadly two types of MTIC fraud, acquisition fraud and carousel fraud.  In 
acquisition fraud, a VAT-registered trader purchases goods from a seller in another EU 
Member State.  This transaction attracts no VAT as cross-border transactions are zero-
rated for VAT purposes.  The trader then sells these goods onwards, charges VAT on 
them and disappears without remitting the tax collected to the tax authority. 
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359.  In its initial stages, carousel fraud is similar to acquisition fraud.  A VAT-registered 
trader imports goods from another EU Member State, paying no VAT on this 
transaction.  The goods are sold onwards, possibly via a number of intermediaries or 
buffer traders, until the final link in this chain exports these goods to an intermediary 
based in another EU Member State.  This exporter submits an input VAT refund claim 
to the tax authority, to reclaim the VAT supposedly paid by him to his supplier.  The 
original importer disappears without paying the VAT due on his sales.  The goods 
could be re-imported by the original importer and the whole cycle repeated many 
times before the importer disappears, thereby giving this type of fraud its name.  
360.  MTIC fraud, being an illegal activity, is inherently difficult to measure. Apart from 
the numbers for a few individual EU Member States covered in this review, we are 
not aware of a single EU-wide estimate of MTIC. 
361.  To the best of our knowledge, the two most significant research efforts on measuring 
MTIC fraud that have been published are those led by the UK’s HMRC and by the 
Belgian Finance Ministry.  We review each in turn. 
HMCE and HMRC’s estimates of MTIC fraud in the UK 
362.  Since 2001, HMCE, and later HMRC, in the UK has published annual estimates of 
MTIC fraud in the UK.  (For ease of exposition, we will refer in this section to 
HMRC to mean both HMCE and HMRC, except when referencing publications.)  The 
documents provide few details on what lies behind the calculations although an 
overview of the approach is provided.  The approach itself has changed over time. 
363.  From 2001 to 2005, HMRC estimated the extent of MTIC fraud on the basis of trade 
data.  The exercise centred on comparing the data on exports to the UK declared in 
other Member States with the imports from other Member States declared in the UK.  
Discrepancies between these two figures are regarded as an upper estimate of MTIC 
as it is thought that there would be other factors, such as the submission of incorrect 
information by traders that could drive a wedge between the two sets of numbers.   
364.  We understand that in its 2001 and 2002 calculation, HMRC produced a lower 
estimate of MTIC fraud by applying to the upper estimate a factor based on estimates 
of carousel fraud in Belgium and the Netherlands (HMCE, 2001, page 18).
28  Because 
the factor only reflected carousel fraud and because it did not take into account the 
fact that VAT registration is easier in the UK than in those two Member States, HMCE 
regarded this as the lower estimate. 
365.  In 2003, HMRC changed its approach to calculating the lower estimate.  It considered 
that the factor applied, based on estimates of carousel fraud in Belgium and in the 
Netherlands in the late 1990s, was unlikely to continue to produce sufficiently robust 
estimates.  Its revised methodology used a subset of the data used to estimate the 
upper limit.  The subset of data used was such that HMRC believed that all that it 
captured was MTIC fraud, but that it did not capture all MTIC fraud.  
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366.  In 2006, HMRC changed its approach altogether.
29  The use of trade data was 
discontinued, on the grounds that the fraudsters’ new modes of operation rendered 
such an approach “unreliable”.  We share HMRC’s view that trade data are inadequate 
to identify the effect of MTIC: there is simply too much noise in trade data to allow 
this to be the case.   The figures put forward by HMRC in 2006 were, instead, 
reported to be “based on operational evidence”; details of what evidence is used and 
how it is used are not provided. 
367.  Table 46 reports the estimates of MTIC for the period 2000/2001 to 2006/2007.   
Table 46  HMRC estimates of attempted MTIC fraud, 2000/2001-2005/2006 




2000/2001 1.31  2.47 
2001/2002 1.72  2.53 
2002/2003 1.54  2.34 
2003/2004 1.06  1.73 
2004/2005 1.12  1.90 
2005/2006  3.50 (2.0)  4.75 (3.0) 
2006/2007  2.25 (1.0)  3.25 (2.0) 
Note: All numbers pertain to attempted fraud. Figures in brackets are estimates of the impact on VAT receipts 
Source: HMRC (2005, 2006 and 2007) “Measuring indirect tax losses” 
368.  The figures reported in Table 46 relate to the value of MTIC fraud attempted.  For 
2005/2006, HMRC estimated that, because some of these attempted frauds are 
stopped, the impact of MTIC fraud on actual receipts was between £2 and £3 billion.  
On the basis of HMRC’s top-down estimate of the VAT gap for that year, £12.4 
billion, the estimates for MTIC imply that this type of fraud accounted between 16 to 
24 per cent of total VAT fraud. 
Belgian Finance Ministry study using Eurocanet data 
369.  This study is subtitled “Spread of the phenomenon [MTIC fraud] in the EU”.  Its 
focus is on identifying differences between countries as to their vulnerability to MTIC 
fraud. 
370.  The paper reports the following elements as being part of a “macro economic 
approach”: 
(a)  The larger economies (Germany, UK, France, Italy and Spain) are likely to be 
more vulnerable to acquisition fraud since they have a large domestic market. 
(b)  There is a correlation between economy size and the importance of electronic 
goods in the economy which further increases the risks of MTIC fraud in the 
larger countries. 
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(c)  Some countries appear to make proportionately much greater VAT repayments 
than others, even after adjusting for the importance of exports to the national 
economy.  This is taken to mean that the UK, France and Spain may be 
particularly affected by MTIC fraud, over and above the factors noted above. 
(d)  A Belgian estimate of EUR 1.1 billion for the cost of MTIC fraud in 2001 
(probably based on operational data collected during the subsequent 
implementation of a carousel fraud prevention strategy, but no source or method 
is given) is used to estimate at 5.1 per cent the proportion of intra-community 
trade in goods which is associated with MTIC fraud. 
(e)  The UK HMRC’s top-down estimate of the total VAT gap and estimate of MTIC 
fraud based on trade data. 
371.  These elements are presented as the backdrop for the main contribution of the paper, 
which is a micro-economic approach based on an extrapolation of data collected 
through the Eurocanet information exchange network. 
372.  The micro-economic approach is based on the mirror flow method, which compares 
(for individual traders) the exports reported through EC sales list with the information 
provided by the purchasers about the acquisition VAT accounted for.  A possible 
broader approach which considers “profiles” of transactions rather than individual 
traders is touched on but not described in detail. 
373.  To extrapolate these transaction-specific data to an estimate of carousel fraud for the 
whole economy, the paper relies on two hypotheses: 
(a)  All carousel fraud takes place through methods known to the tax authorities, and 
the proportion of fraud using different methods is the same in the sample of cases 
that have been investigated as for carousel fraud as a whole.  This hypothesis is 
justified by a review of operational experience, in particular the small number of 
modes of operation for carousel fraud that have emerged over the last 10 years. 
(b)  There is no correlation between the mode of operation of a carousel fraud and the 
time it takes to detect it.  This hypothesis is also supported by operational data. 
374.  Based on these hypotheses and on data about detected carousel fraud from the 
Eurocanet network (analysed through a mirror flow method), the Belgian Finance 
Ministry reports the following results. 
375.  The largest detected fraudulent transactions relate to UK carousel fraud using goods 
traded through Dubai.  These transactions were reported in Eurocanet with a variety 
of destination countries (in particular Spain) but according to the Ministry correspond 
to fraud against UK VAT only. 
376.  Other types of carousel fraud (which are spread across all EU countries) account for 
medium-size detected fraudulent transactions.  The minority of non-fraudulent 
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377.  Omitting carousel fraud using good traded through Dubai, the VAT lost in the adjusted 
Eurocanet dataset is distributed as follows for the five largest EU countries 
(2005/2006 data): 
(a)  The UK bears 25.4 per cent of total EU carousel fraud losses. 
(b)  Spain bears 17.3 per cent of total EU carousel fraud losses. 
(c)  Italy bears 15.7 per cent of total EU carousel fraud losses. 
(d)  Germany bears 13.2 per cent of total EU carousel fraud losses. 
(e)  France bears 10.2 per cent of total EU carousel fraud losses. 
378.  No other country is estimated to bear more than 5 per cent of total EU carousel fraud 
losses. 
379.  These figures are consistent with the review of factors affecting fraud (size, 
importance of electronic goods, level of VAT repayments, etc.) reviewed above. 
380.  Adding back the fraud using goods traded through Dubai to the Eurocanet dataset also 
trebles the fraud estimate for the UK (the method assumes that all Dubai-method 
fraud is against UK VAT). 
381.  The report also provides illustrative “ceiling” financial estimates for losses due to 
VAT carousel fraud.  These estimates are based on an extrapolation of the Eurocanet 
data using the assumptions that total non-Dubai carousel fraud amounted to EUR 14.8 
billion across the EU. 
382.  This figure is an average of four estimates or assumptions based for the most part on 
trade data matching; as a proportion of GDP, it is higher than HMRC’s estimate (even 
though HMRC’s estimate relates to total MTIC fraud and the EUR 14.8 billion figure 
relates only to non-Dubai carousel fraud).  These assumptions lead to an illustrative 
MTIC fraud loss figure of EUR 8.85 billion for the UK, of which: 
(a)  EUR 3.75 billion is non-Dubai fraud: a 25.4 per cent share of the assumed EUR 
14.8 billion EU-wide figure. 
(b)  EUR 5.1 billion is Dubai-method fraud: extrapolated from the proportion of 
Dubai and non-Dubai fraud in the Eurocanet dataset and the assumed EUR 14.8 
billion EU-wide figure for non-Dubai fraud. 
383.  This estimate is several times higher than HMRC’s estimates of MTIC fraud for the 
UK. We do not find a reasonable basis on which the study draws to estimate the 
overall estimate of the amount of MTIC fraud that is, in a subsequent step of the 
analysis, allocated to a set of Member States. Appendix   
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Table 48   List of 2-digit CPA products 
01-Products of agriculture, hunting and related services 
02-Products of forestry, logging and related services 
05-Fish and other fishing products; services incidental of fishing 
10-Coal and lignite; peat 
11-Crude petroleum and natural gas; services incidental to oil and gas extraction excluding surveying 
12-Uranium and thorium ores 
13-Metal ores 
14-Other mining and quarrying products 
15-Food products and beverages 
16-Tobacco products 
17-Textiles 
18-Wearing apparel; furs 
19-Leather and leather products 
20-Wood and products of wood and cork (except furniture); articles of straw and plaiting materials 
21-Pulp, paper and paper products 
22-Printed matter and recorded media 
23-Coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuels 
24-Chemicals, chemical products and man-made fibres 
25-Rubber and plastic products 
26-Other non-metallic mineral products 
27-Basic metals 
28-Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 
29-Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
30-Office machinery and computers 
31-Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 
32-Radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus 
33-Medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks 
34-Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
35-Other transport equipment 
36-Furniture; other manufactured goods n.e.c. 
37-Secondary raw materials 
40-Electrical energy, gas, steam and hot water 
41-Collected and purified water, distribution services of water 
45-Construction work 
50-Trade, maintenance and repair services of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of automotive fuel 
51-Wholesale trade and commission trade services, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
52-Retail  trade services, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair services of personal and household 
goods 
55-Hotel and restaurant services 
60-Land transport; transport via pipeline services 
61-Water transport services 
62-Air transport services Appendix   
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63-Supporting and auxiliary transport services; travel agency services 
64-Post and telecommunication services 
65-Financial intermediation services, except insurance and pension funding services 
66-Insurance and pension funding services, except compulsory social security services 
67-Services auxiliary to financial intermediation 
70-Real estate services 
71-Renting services of machinery and equipment without operator and of personal and household goods 
72-Computer and related services 
73-Research and development services 
74-Other business services 
75-Public administration and defence services; compulsory social security services 
80-Education services 
85-Health and social work services 
90-Sewage and refuse disposal services, sanitation and similar services 
91-Membership organisation services n.e.c. 
92-Recreational, cultural and sporting services 
93-Other services 
95-Private households with employed persons 
 